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Understanding the mechanism through which ￿nancial globalization a⁄ects eco-
nomic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and bene￿ts of opening ￿nancial
markets. This paper is a ￿rst attempt at disentangling the e⁄ects of ￿nancial inte-
gration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP)
and investment. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 70 countries observed
between 1975 and 1999. The results for both de jure and de facto indicators suggest
that ￿nancial integration has a positive direct e⁄ect on productivity, while it does
not directly a⁄ect capital accumulation. I also control for indirect e⁄ects of ￿nancial
globalization through ￿nancial development and banking and currency crises. While
￿nancial integration does not systematically increase domestic ￿nancial depth, it may
raise the likelyhood of banking crises, though only to a minor extent. Yet, the overall
e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization remains positive for productivity and negligible for
investment.
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11 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
globalization on growth.1 The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions
has on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for
triggering ￿nancial instability and crises. Yet, little has been done to address empirically
the mechanism through which ￿nancial liberalization a⁄ects growth. How do the main
sources of growth - total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation - react to
￿nancial globalization? This issue is of particular relevance for at least two reasons. First,
understanding how TFP and investments are a⁄ected by ￿nancial liberalization would
allow us to identify which models are more appropriate to analyze and predict the economic
e⁄ects of ￿nancial globalization. Second, answering the question above would greatly help
understand the welfare e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) show
that, whether capital or TFP react to ￿nancial openness, matters signi￿cantly for the size
of welfare gains (or losses).2 Only recently, a few studies have started addressing this
important issue. Among them, this paper is a ￿rst attempt at disentangling the e⁄ects of
￿nancial globalization on aggregate productivity and capital accumulation.
The theoretical literature proposes various mechanisms through which ￿nancial glob-
alization may a⁄ect economic growth, with di⁄erent implications for investments and pro-
ductivity. In the neo-classical framework, all e⁄ects are generated through capital ￿ ows.
In the standard model, opening international capital markets generates ￿ ows from capital-
abundant towards capital-scarce countries, thereby accelerating convergence (hence short
term growth) in the poor countries. In a more sophisticated context, also productiv-
ity may increase since capital in￿ ows relieve the economy from credit constraints and
thus allow agents to undertake more productive investments (as in Acemoglu and Zili-
botti, 1997). An alternative view (see Saint-Paul, 1992 and Obstfeld, 1994) suggests that
international capital mobility may a⁄ect productivity independently of investments, by
promoting international risk diversi￿cation, wich induces more domestic risk taking in
innovation activities, thereby fostering growth. To understand which theory is more ap-
propriate to address the e⁄ects of ￿nancial globalization on growth, I separately regress
investments and productivity on a series of indicators of international ￿nancial liberaliza-
tion, and study whether TFP and capital react di⁄erently across developed and developing
1Here ￿nancial globalization is meant to be the absence of restrictions to international ￿nancial trans-
actions. Henceforth, I will equivalently refer to it as (international) ￿nancial liberalization, ￿nancial
integration, or ￿nancial openness.
2Their quantitative exercise points out that the bene￿ts from an acceleration in capital accumulation
along the convergence to the steady state, are way smaller (up to a ￿ftieth) than the gains from an
improvement in productivity, hence in the steady state to which the economy converges.
2countries.
I also investigate two indirect channels linking ￿nancial integration to capital accumu-
lation and TFP. First, as pointed out by Rodrik (1998) and Stiglitz (2000) among others,
￿nancial liberalization may trigger ￿nancial instability, that is detrimental for both invest-
ments in physical capital and productivity.3 I account for the e⁄ects of ￿nancial instability
by controlling all regressions for indicators of banking and currency crises. In this way, any
indirect e⁄ect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for ￿nancial
liberalization. I also estimate the joint e⁄ect of crises and liberalization and I explicitly
address the link between ￿nancial liberalization and the likelihood of ￿nancial crises.
As another indirect e⁄ect, ￿nancial globalization may foster ￿nancial development (see
Klein and Olivei, 1999), i.e. the availability of external ￿nance to the private sector, which
Beck et al. (2000) show to spur productivity more than investments. To disentangle this
channel, I ￿rst control for a measure of ￿nancial depth in the regressions for TFP and
capital. Next, I separately address the link between ￿nancial integration and ￿nancial
depth.
The main results are robust to using two de jure and one de facto measures of ￿nancial
integration and to adopting various econometric methodologies. They suggest the follow-
ing: (1) International ￿nancial liberalization has a positive direct e⁄ect on TFP, especially
in developed countries. (2) The direct e⁄ect on capital accumulation is insigni￿cant. (3)
Banking and currency crises generally harm both capital accumulation and productivity.
However, (4) ￿nancial liberalization raises only the probability that developed countries
experience minor banking crises and has virtually no e⁄ect on the likelihood of currency
crises. (5) There is weak support for the hypothesis that ￿nancial integration a⁄ects
productivity and investment by promoting ￿nancial depth.
The ￿rst two results appear di¢ cult to reconcile within the neo-classical framework.
Models predicting a rise in productivity due to e¢ cient reallocation of capital within
countries, with possibly no e⁄ect on overall capital accumulation, seem more suited to ra-
tionalize this evidence. After presenting the empirical analysis, I discuss more in depth the
theories that may explain these results and provide supporting evidence for the proposed
mechanisms.
This paper is mainly related to four strands of literature. The studies on growth
and development accounting have shown that a large share of cross-country di⁄erences in
economic performance and growth is driven by total factor productivity (TFP) rather than
factor accumulation (physical and human capital).4 Hence, ￿nancial globalization seems
3See Aizenman (2001) for a survey on the evidence on ￿nancial liberalization and crises.
4See Caselli (2005) for a survey on the develpment accounting literature, and Easterly and Levine (2001)
3more likely to impact long-run growth if it a⁄ects TFP, rather than factor accumulation.
This is indeed the main empirical result of the paper.
The theoretical literature on ￿nance and growth argues that ￿nancial development
spurs GDP growth not only by raising the funds available for accumulation, but also by
fostering productivity growth.5 King and Levine (1993), and more in detail Beck et al.
(2000) show empirical evidence of a strong e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on TFP growth,
and only a tenuous one on physical capital accumulation. In the same spirit, this paper
analyzes separately the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on TFP and investments. Moreover,
it partially encompasses the exercise in Beck et al. (2000) by assessesing whether ￿nancial
depth works as an indirect channel through which globalization a⁄ects productivity and
capital accumulation.
A wide empirical literature addresses the e⁄ects of ￿nancial globalization on economic
growth and volatility with various datasets and methodologies.6 Some studies (for in-
stance, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, Kraay, 2000 and Rodrik, 1998) ￿nd that ￿nancial
liberalization does not a⁄ect growth, others that the e⁄ect is positive (Quinn, 1997, Levine,
2001 and Bekaert et al., 2005 among others), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen
and Leblang, 2003).7 Perhaps surprisingly, little evidence exists on the e⁄ects of ￿nan-
cial globalization on the main sources of growth: productivity and capital accumulation.8
Two recent works are particularly related to this paper. Levchenko et al. (2008) study the
e⁄ect of de jure and de facto capital account liberalization on investments, productivity
and growth focusing on industry-level data. Henry and Sasson (2008) address the reaction
of sectoral real wages, investment and labor productivity to de jure equity market liber-
alization in developing countries. In the ￿nal section, I discuss the results of these works
and relate them to the evidence in this paper.
The link between ￿nancial globalization, crises and growth has been widely debated
during the last twenty years. A series of empirical contributions (see Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999 and Glick and Hutchison, 2000) provide evidence that the occurrence of
currency and banking crises is associated to the absence of capital account restrictions.
for the stylized facts on development and growth accounting.
5Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) among others show that ￿-
nancial development may relieve risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through
technological change.
6See Kose et al. (2006) and Henry (2007) for extensive surveys of this literature.
7These e⁄ects are also shown to be heterogeneous across countries at di⁄erent stages of institutional
and economic development (see Bekaert et al., 2005 and Edwards, 2001), with di⁄erent macroeconomic
frameworks (Arteta Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001), and adopting a di⁄erent sequence of other ￿nancial
reforms (see Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003 and Bekaert et al., 2005).
8As a ￿rst step in this direction, Chari and Henry (2002) ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of equity market
liberalization on investment and the Tobin￿ s Q of listed ￿rms, and conclude that these must be driven by
changes in productivity, which they do not explore directly.
4Works by Bordo et al. (2001), Leblang (2003) and Glick, Guo and Hutchison (2006)
however ￿nd ￿nancial liberalization to be negatively correlated with the onset of currency
crises. The present paper does not aim at studying in depth the determinants of ￿nancial
crises. Rather, I perform probit estimations for the occurrence of banking and currency
crises in order to evaluate the overall e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration on productivity and
capital accumulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y introduces the
empirical strategy, and describes the dataset and the variables used in the analysis. Section
3 presents the econometric methodologies and reports the estimation results for TFP and
capital. Section 4 investigates further the indirect e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration through
￿nancial crises and ￿nancial development. Section 5 discusses the results of section 3,
relates them to the evidence in other studies, and provides a theoretical explanation to
reconcile them. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy and the data
The previous studies on the impact of ￿nancial liberalization on growth have estimated
various versions of the equation:
dyit = b0 + b1yit￿1 + b0
2Zit + b3IFLit + eit; (1)
where dyit ￿ dlog(Yit) is the growth rate of GDP in country i, yit￿1 is the logarithm
of lagged GDP, Zit is a vector of control variables, IFLit is an indicator of ￿nancial
liberalization, and eit is the error term.
The literature on growth and development accounting has shown total factor produc-
tivity (A) and capital (K) accumulation to be the main determinants of cross-country
di⁄erentials in GDP growth rates. This paper, instead of considering Y , focuses on its
main components and proposes estimates of the following equation:
Pit = ￿0 + ￿0
1Xit + ￿IFLit + uit;
where Pit represents in turn A, K or their growth rates in country i at time t, X is a vector
of control variables, IFL the indicator of ￿nancial integration, and u the error term.
I perform the analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset with annual observations for at
most 70 countries, spanning from 1975 to 1999. Depending on the econometric method-
ology in use, I consider in turn a cross-section of 69 countries with data averaged over the
sample period, and a panel comprising up to 70 countries with non-overlapping ￿ve-year
observations over the same period. The following subsections describe the main variables
5included in the regressions: TFP, the stock of physical capital, three measures of ￿nancial
integration, indicators of ￿nancial crises and other control variables.
2.1 Capital accumulation
I retrieve the series of the physical capital stocks, K, applying the perpetual inventory
method as in Hall and Jones (1999) on data from the Penn World Tables 6.1. I estimate
the initial stock of capital, Kt0 as
It0
g+￿, where I is investment, g is the average geometric
growth rate of total investment between t0 and t0+ 10.9 In the paper t0 is 1960, since I
have data on investment dating back to that year for most countries.10 A depreciation
rate ￿ of 6 per cent is assumed. The following values of the capital stock are computed as
Kt = (1￿ ￿)Kt￿1+ It.
2.2 Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following Hall and Jones (1999). I assume




where Yi is the output produced in country i, Ki is the stock of physical capital in use, Ai
is labor-augmenting productivity, Li is labor and Hi is a measure of the average human
capital of workers (HiLi is therefore human capital-augmented labor).11 The factor share
￿ is assumed constant across countries and equal to 1/3, which matches national account
data for developed countries. I adopt the following speci￿cation for labor-augmenting
human capital as a function of the years of schooling, si:
Hi = e￿(si):
I rely on the results of Psacharopulos￿(1994) survey and specify ￿(si) as a piecewise linear
function with coe¢ cients 0.134 for the ￿rst four years of education, 0.101 for the next four
years, and 0.068 for any value of si > 8.
Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from
9Investment is de￿ned as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1.
10In the countries which have no data for 1960 t0 is the ￿rst year followed by at least 15 observations.
11Labor is computed as rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the PWT 6.1. Note also that in Hall and Jones
(1999) Yi is rgdpch*pop from the PWT, net of the value-added of the mining industry. Following Caselli
(2005), I simplify and take rgdpch*pop.











I use three di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial integration. First, I use a de jure dummy in-
dicator of capital account liberalization, IMF, that takes value 0 if a country has held
restrictions on capital account transactions by the residents during the year, and 1 oth-
erwise. The existence of restrictions is classi￿ed on a 0-1 basis by the IMF in its Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which is avail-
able for a maximum of 212 countries over the period 1967- 1996.12 The major limit of
this indicator is that it does not capture the extent to which countries take advantage of
liberalization by trading capital internationally. Despite this and the other limits summa-
rized in Edison et al. (2002), IMF is the most commonly used indicator of international
￿nancial liberalization.
Second, I use the de jure index of capital account liberalization compiled by Quinn,
that is available for a small number of developed countries (18 in my sample) on a yearly
basis, while it covers 142 countries (60 in my sample) with observations for 1958, 1973,
1982, 1988, and 1997. This indicator (Quinn), taking values between 0 (total restriction)
and 100 (perfect capital account liberalization), is based on the information provided in
the AREAER about restrictions on residents and non-residents, and takes into account
the severity of restrictions across all categories of ￿nancial transactions.
Third, to estimate the e⁄ects of the actual participation of a country in international
capital markets (de facto ￿nancial integration), I take as an indicator its gross external
position as a ratio of GDP. This variable, IFIGDP= (Total Foreign Assets + Foreign Total
Liabilities)/GDP, was built by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) using assets and liabilities
data on FDI, equity portfolios, debt, derivatives and o¢ cial reserves adjusted for valuation,
and is available for 145 countries over the period 1970-2004 (67 countries between 1975
and 1999 in my sample). Note however that the debt component of this indicator includes
sovereign debt (assets and liabilities), and countries￿debts with o¢ cial creditors such
as the IMF, which abstract from the conventional de￿nition of ￿nancial integration. It
follows that even countries where capital account transactions are forbidden to private
agents (classi￿ed as closed by any de jure index) may have gross foreign debt positions
12Classi￿cation methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly
be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classi￿cations, though for a
limited number of countries, and over a short time span.
7and be therefore considered de facto integrated with the international ￿nancial markets.
This implies that the estimates for IFIGDP may confound the e⁄ects of sovereign foreign
debt with those of liberalizing private cross-border transactions. This problem could be
solved by subtracting sovereign foreign debt positions from IFIGDP, but data are not
available at this level of disaggregation.
I overcome the limits of the de jure dummy and the de facto measure by regressing
TFP and capital accumulation on IMF, IFIGDP and their interaction. The estimates for
IMF*IFIGDP capture the e⁄ect of de facto integration in countries that do not impose
restrictions on capital account transactions.
2.4 Financial Crises
When accounting for ￿nancial crises, I distinguish between banking and currency crises.
For banking crises (BC), I adopt the anecdotal indicator proposed by Caprio and Klinge-
biel (2003), that keeps record of 117 systemic and 51 non-systemic crises occurring in 93
and 45 countries respectively, from the late 1970￿ s onwards. On a yearly basis, the variable
BC takes value 2 or 1 if the country has experienced a systemic or a borderline banking
crisis respectively, and 0 otherwise. Caprio and Klingebiel label a crisis as systemic if a
substantial proportion of banks￿capital has been exhausted and borderline if the losses
were less severe. For example, the 1991 crisis in Sweden was systemic, since it involved in-
solvency or serious di¢ culties for 90 per cent of the banking system. The isolated failures
of three UK banks between the Eighties and the Nineties, as well as the solvency problems
of Credit Lyonnais in France in 1994-95, are instead labeled as borderline crises.
I rely on Glick and Hutchison (2000) for the chronology of currency crises (CC). They
label as currency crises ￿large￿ variations (i.e. exceeding the sample mean plus twice
the country-speci￿c standard deviation) in an exchange rate pressure index, de￿ned as a
weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly reserve losses. On a
yearly base, the variable CC takes value 1 if the country has experienced such a ￿large￿
variation, 0 otherwise. This dummy is available for 90 countries between 1975 and 1997.
For robustness check, I also use the banking and currency crises dummy variables
compiled by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) for 56 countries
between 1973 and 1997 (available for 21 of them since 1880).13 An episode quali￿es as a
currency crisis (CC_BEKM-P= 1) if either of the following occurs: (1) a forced change
in parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange rate, or an international rescue; (2) the
index of exchange market pressure exceeds a critical threshold.14 The dummy for banking
13Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), among others, used these indicators.
14The exchange pressure index is calculated here as a weighted average of the percentage change in the
8crises, BC_BEKM-P, takes value 1 if a systemic banking crisis as de￿ned in Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003) occurs, 0 otherwise.
2.5 Other controls
Financial depth is proxied by the ratio of total credit to the private sector over GDP
(privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate. This variable gives a
measure of the external ￿nance available to ￿rms. I control for privo in the equations for
both investments and productivity to disentangle the direct e⁄ect of liberalization from
the indirect one through ￿nancial depth.15 I include the growth rate of privo in the linear
probability models for ￿nancial crises, to account for the possibility that crises come along
as by-products of sustained growth of the ￿nancial system (see RanciŁre et al., 2007).
I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1) in the re-
gressions for capital accumulation as several theories predict that government expenditure
crowds out private investment. I also use it as a covariate for the likelihood of ￿nancial
crises.
I control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of GDP
(openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of an economy through several
channels, such as specialization, access to larger markets with more product variety and
increased competition. These e⁄ects may stimulate both capital accumulation and pro-
ductivity growth. Openness to trade is also included among the determinants of ￿nancial
crises.
Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by giving
incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr) by Ginarte and
Park (1997), which is available for ￿ve-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth, I explicitly control for institutional
quality proxied by the Government Anti-Diversion Policy index (GADP, built as Hall and
Jones, 1999 with annual data from the International Country Risk Guide).
As an indicator of economic development, I construct a dummy (LDC￿ s)that takes
value 1 if the country is de￿ned as low or middle-low income in the World Development
Indicators, and 0 otherwise. In the regressions for productivity and investment, I add this
indicator interacted with the proxies of ￿nancial integration, to check for heterogeneity in
exchange rate, the change in the short-term interest rate, and the percentage change in reserves, all relative
to the same variables in the center country. The threshold is 1.5 standard deviations above the mean.
15Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001) show that ￿nancial liberalization promotes ￿nancial devel-
opment, which, according to Beck et al. (2000), may be expected to foster productivity more than capital
accumulation.
9the e⁄ects across developed and developing countries.16
I include a measure of deposit insurance (from Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001)
among the covariates for crises, since Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that
the existence of explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and thus
crises of the banking sector.
I also control for in￿ation (from the World Development Indicators) as a determi-
nant of banking and currency crises crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad
macroeconomic policies, which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
2.6 A quick overview of the data
Table A lists the 70 countries in the sample and the dates in which they removed or
imposed de jure restrictions on capital account transactions as de￿ned by the IMF. Table
B reports statistics for all indicators of ￿nancial integration, ￿nancial crises, TPF growth
and capital accumulation across continents. Rows 2 and 3 contain respectively the numbers
of reforms into and out of capital account liberalization, while row 1 indicates the number
of country-years with open capital account (IMF= 1). Note that the twenty-two African
countries in the sample never experienced ￿nancial openness, while countries in the rest
of the world were open in about one third of the observations. The pattern of reforms
varies across all continents, ranging from 3 liberalizations and one restriction in Asia, to
10 unreverted openings in Europe and North America, to 12 switches into openness and
11 out of it in Latin America. The other two measures of ￿nancial integration display less
heterogeneity. Europe and North America are almost twice as open as Africa according to
Quinn￿ s de jure index, while they look similar with respect to average de facto integration.
The uneven pattern of ￿nancial openness in Africa, and the fact that African countries
are generally much poorer than the rest of the sample, suggest that these observations
may bias the estimates. In particular, the poor TFP performance of African countries
(second last line of Table B) may bias the coe¢ cient estimates upwards for the IMF de
jure indicator, and downwards for the continuous de facto measure. I will account for this
possibility by including interaction terms and splitting the sample. Another special case
is Latin America, whose high degree of de jure ￿nancial openness (line 1) is characterized,
di⁄erently from the other countries, by the occurrence of many policy reversals (lines 2
and 3). Moreover, its high scores in de facto integration hinge heavily on debt rather
than equity, suggesting that sovereign positions and loans from o¢ cial lenders may play a
16This gives equivalent results to interacting ￿nancial integration either with initial real per capita GDP,
or with a dummy for countries with real per capita GDP below sample average. The results are available
upon request.
10prominent (and possibly di⁄erent) role. As for Africa, I will address in the next sections
the possibility that ￿nancial liberalization has a di⁄erent impact on TFP and capital
accumulation also in Latin American countries.
This section explains the methodologies I follow to assess the e⁄ects of ￿nancial inte-
gration on capital accumulation and productivity, and reports the results. I ￿rst present
the di⁄erence in di⁄erence approach applied to yearly panel data, then I turn to the long-
run cross-sectional analysis using twenty-￿ve year averages, to conclude with the dynamic
panel regressions performed on non-overlapping ￿ve-year observations.
2.7 Panel difference in difference
I fully exploit the cross-sectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and
estimate
Pit = ￿0 + ￿0
1Xit￿1 + ￿IFLit￿1 + ￿i + ￿t + "it; (2)
where Pit is a proxy for the outcome variable (either log(K) or log(A) in the various spec-
i￿cations) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables including the indicators
of ￿nancial crises BC and CC and IFL is an indicator of ￿nancial liberalization. To
alleviate the simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. I start by considering
the de jure dummy for capital account liberalization (IMF). ￿i is a country-speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ect capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are speci￿c to i, and its inclu-
sion in (2) implies that ￿ is only estimated from the within-country variation around the
liberalization date. Including the year ￿xed e⁄ects (￿t) allows me to compare the change
in P between the pre and post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the
change in the countries that maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (2) is a
￿di⁄erence in di⁄erence￿speci￿cation, since it implies di⁄erencing out the time-mean for
each i, and the common trend for all i￿ s at any t. Two main problems may undermine the
ability of ￿ to identify a causal link from ￿nancial liberalization to the sources of growth.
First, there may be concerns about the selection of the countries that liberalized. Sup-
pose that fewer episodes of liberalization were observed among countries that share a
certain characteristic, and the countries with that characteristic experienced particularly
low productivity. Then this trend in productivity, speci￿c to countries with that charac-
teristic, may bias the estimated e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration upwards. To tackle this issue,
I ￿rst identify the most important factors that in￿ uence the decision to liberalize capital
account transactions, by estimating the following probit on the annual panel dataset:
Pr(IMF_rit = 1) = ￿(￿o + ￿1Xit):
11IMF_rit, with r 2 fopen;closeg is an indicator of the reforms observed in country i
at time t, and Xit is a set of covariates.17 IMF_open equals 1 if a switch into capital
account liberalization occurs, zero otherwise. IMF_close equals 1 if restrictions are put
in place, zero otherwise. I also estimate a probit for the unconditional probability that
restrictions are not in place, i.e. Pr(IMF = 1). The coe¢ cient estimates in Table C rep-
resent the percentage changes in probability associated to an increase in the covariates.
The z-statistics reported below each coe¢ cient are derived from robust standard errors,
clustered by country. Consistently with the evidence in Glick et al. (2006), countries with
higher ￿nancial development are more likely to be ￿nancially open, while they are not
more likely to adopt, nor to abandon, capital account liberalization. The probability of
switching into liberalization is expectedly higher where institutions are better. Current
account over GDP has no signi￿cant e⁄ect across the speci￿cations in Table C, meaning
that large current de￿cits do not call for capital restrictions. However, if taken in ab-
solute value current account desplays positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients, suggesting that
countries with a large current account exposure, irrespectively of its sign, are more incline
to liberalize capital transactions. Moreover, as argued in section 2.6, there seem to be
also systematic di⁄erences in the pattern of capital account liberalization (IMF) and in
productivity and investment across areas. This suggests that the di⁄erence in di⁄erence
estimates for ￿ might be a⁄ected by selection bias. To amend this bias, I control the
regressions for continental trends in both productivity and capital.
A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens
up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is
already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive e⁄ect to ￿-
nancial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased estimates.
As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the three or
￿ve years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. Comparing the coe¢ cient for this
dummy with ￿ allows me to verify whether the change in P was part of a previous trend or
followed liberalization. As a robustness check, I replace the dummy variable with a trend
variable, taking values 1, 2 and 3, respectively three, two and one years before the reform.
Moreover, I assess whether both reforms into and out of capital account liberalization
(opening when a country is closed and closing when a country is open) promote economic
performance, to test if countries systematically adopt the reform that fosters growth.
A concern about the consistency of di⁄erence in di⁄erence estimators may arise if the
17Following Glick et al. (2006), I include among the covariates the current account as a ratio of GDP, the
US real interest rate, government expenditure, openness to trade, and a measure of institutional quality
(gadp). I also control for the occurrence of banking and currency crises in the previous year.
12dependent variable is autocorrelated, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). In this
case, the standard errors of the coe¢ cient ￿ would be underestimated, thereby biasing
the t-statistics towards over-rejection of the null ￿ = 0. Bertrand et al. (2004) propose
several methods to get around this problem. I will follow their suggestion and estimate
equation (2) without IMF, save the residuals only for the countries that experienced a
reform, and regress them on IMF.18 This is equivalent to identifying ￿ o⁄ the di⁄erence
in the residuals before and after the reform.
The evidence produced with di⁄erence in di⁄erence estimations is suggestive, since it
gives a measure of the di⁄erential in economic performance explained by a clear-cut reform.
As it is frequently pointed out in the literature though, the extent of ￿nancial integration
cannot be fully captured by a zero-one indicator. There are many di⁄erent restrictions
that can be removed at di⁄erent times, so that countries that are equally labeled as open
by the AREAR dummy may actually enjoy di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial integration. Also,
the extent to which an open country is active in the global capital market may vary over
time. Using the de facto measures of ￿nancial integration described above allows me to
take into account these concerns. Hence, I replicate most of the analysis considering the
de facto measure IFIGDP instead of IMF, and then both indicators jointly with their
interaction.
2.7.1 Productivity
Tables 1a, 2a and 3a report the results from the di⁄erence in di⁄erence regressions for
TFP levels on yearly data. The speci￿cation in columns 1 and 2 only includes the de jure
indicator of capital account liberalization (IMF), whose e⁄ects on productivity are posi-
tive. These coe¢ cients are robust to controlling for trends in TFP up to three years prior
to liberalization (IMF_switch3) and for time-continent e⁄ects, as reported in column 2.19
The coe¢ cients for de jure liberalization (IMF) are positive and signi￿cant also across
all speci￿cations in columns 3-8. Banking crises have a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on
TFP under all speci￿cations, while the negative coe¢ cient for currency crises is signi￿cant
(at ten per cent con￿dence level) only in columns 3 and 5. The interactions between de
jure liberalization and ￿nancial crises of column 4 show that the e⁄ects of banking and
currency crises do not di⁄er across open and closed countries. The interactions with the
Latin American dummy in column 5 suggest that the impact of capital account liberaliza-
tion is positive all over. The statistically zero coe¢ cients for IMF*LDC￿ s and IMF post
￿ 85 in columns 6 and 7 exclude di⁄erent e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on productivity
18This procedure is referred to as ￿ignoring time series information￿in Bertrand et al. (2004).
19The results do not change if I use IMF_switch5, which equals 1 for the ￿ve years prior to the reform.
13between developed and developing countries, as well as across the ￿rst and the second
half of the sample period. Column 8 shows that intellectual property right protection, as
expected, raises TFP, and that richer countries tend to have higher productivity. Despite
the inclusion of real per capita GDP, the coe¢ cient for IMF remains positive and signi￿-
cant, which does not lend support to the argument that open countries perform better in
terms of TFP simply because they are also richer. Notice that the estimate for ￿nancial
depth is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, suggesting that ￿nancial depth may not be
an e⁄ective indirect channel linking liberalization and productivity.
To check the robustness of these results to changes in the indicators of ￿nancial integra-
tion and crises, I replicate some of the estimations of Table 1a replacing the de jure index
IMF with the de facto measure IFGDP, and substituting the ￿nancial crises indicators
by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchison (2000) (CK-GH henceforth)
with the dummies proposed by Bordo et al. (2001) (BEKM-P henceforth). The results
are reported in Table 2a. In column 1, I regress TFP on de facto ￿nancial integration
(IFIGDP) and the CK-GH crises indicators. While banking crises lose signi￿cance, the
gross external position has a negative impact on TFP. As mentioned above, the estimates
for IFIGDP may deliver a distorted picture of the link between ￿nancial globalization
and economic outcomes, especially if countries that are de jure closed have large sovereign
debt positions (such as most of the African countries in Table B). To account for this po-
tential bias, in column 2 I control also for de jure liberalization (IMF) and its interaction
with the de facto measure. The coe¢ cients for IFIGDP and IFIGDP*IMF suggest that
de facto integration does spur TFP when accompanied by de jure liberalization. Large
gross external positions in presence of de jure restrictions may be arguably composed by
sovereign foreign debt and loans from o¢ cial creditors (e.g. the IMF). In line with this
argument, column 3 shows that an increase in gross external positions reduced produc-
tivity in African and Latin American countries (hinging greatly on foreign sovereign debt
and o¢ cial loans), while it spurred TFP in the rest of the world. The interaction with
the dummy for LDC￿ s in column 4 suggests that ￿nancial integration was productivity
enhancing in the developed countries, not in the developing ones. The robustness analysis
with ￿nancial crises indicators by Bordo et al. (2001), in columns 5-7 con￿rms the pre-
vious results. Notice that 13 countries, mainly African and Latin American, are dropped
from the sample when changing crises indicators. Their exclusion explains the loss of
signi￿cance for the de facto measure alone in column 6.
Table 3a reports robustness checks on the di⁄erence in di⁄erences estimates with the
maximum number of controls, reported in column 8 of Table 1a. The ￿rst two columns
refer to the correction proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004). In column 1, I report the
14results from regressing the physical capital stock on all control variables but IMF, and
controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. Column 2 shows the coe¢ cient estimated
regressing on IMF the residuals from the speci￿cation in column 1 only for the countries
that experienced a reform to capital account restrictions. Banking crises and per capita
GDP maintain the coe¢ cients of column 8 in Table 1a, and ￿nancial integration is shown
to raise signi￿cantly productivity by almost 8 per cent. In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify
the e⁄ect of a policy switch out of ￿nancial openness. In column 3, I restrict the attention
to those countries that were not closed all the time, and regress capital stock on the usual
controls plus an indicator that takes value one if there is not ￿nancial openness and zero
otherwise. In this way, the coe¢ cient compares the change in TFP before and after the
adoption of restrictions in the countries that closed their ￿nancial markets with the change
in TFP in the countries that remained open. The coe¢ cient for IMF_close suggests that
TFP grew less in the countries that closed their ￿nancial markets relative to the countries
that remained open. In column 4, I take the full sample and regress productivity on an
indicator that equals 0 if a country is open in a given year or if it is closed throughout the
entire sample, and 1 otherwise. The negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for IMF_close
suggests that productivity growth was lower after countries closed their ￿nancial markets.
These results prove that regime switches out of ￿nancial liberalization have not the same,
positive e⁄ect of switches into it. In columns 5-7, I control in alternative ways for the pre-
reform trends in TFP. In column 5, I decompose the pre-reform trend dummy IMF_switch
into two dummies for switches into and out of liberalization. In column 6, these dummies
are no longer step dummies, but take the form of a three-period linear trend in the three
years prior to reforms. In both cases their introduction does not a⁄ect the signi￿cance
of the coe¢ cient for ￿nancial openness. Column 7 reports the result from adding a pre-
reform trend for each country that has liberalized. Again, no signi￿cant changes occur
with respect to the other regressions.
Overall, in countries that removed restrictions on residents￿capital account transac-
tions TFP grew by 5 to 8 per cent more than in those that did not. Countries that doubled
their gross external position over GDP (IFIGDP) had a 1 per cent increase in productivity
if de jure closed, while they enjoyed a 10 per cent rise if open. The occurrence of a banking
and crisis worsens TFP performance by 3 to 5 per cent, while currency crises by 2-3 per
cent. The coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant for the BEKM-P indicators.
2.7.2 Capital
Table 1b reports the results from the di⁄erence in di⁄erence regressions for the logarithm
of physical capital stock, log(K), on yearly data. The speci￿cation in columns 1 and 2 only
15includes the de jure indicator of capital account liberalization (IMF), whose e⁄ects on
investments are negative. These coe¢ cients are robust to controlling for trends in capital
up to three years prior to liberalization (IMF_switch3) and for time-continent e⁄ects, as
reported in column 2.20 Columns 3 and 4 show that banking crises (BC) and ￿nancial
integration have a negative e⁄ect on capital accumulation, while currency crises seem to
be irrelevant. Moreover, the estimates for the interactive terms IMF*BC and IMF*CC
in column 4 suggest that ￿nancial crises do not have di⁄erent e⁄ects across closed and
open countries. The interaction analysis in columns 5 and 6 shows that capital account
liberalization restrained capital accumulation less in developing countries, as well as in
Latin America. Column 7 does not support the hypothesis that ￿nancial integration has
di⁄erent e⁄ects across the ￿rst and the second half of the sample period (pre and post
1985). When I control for real per capita GDP, government expenditure and credit to
the private sector as a ratio of GDP (column 8), the results for IMF, and CC remain
unchanged, while BC becomes positive and signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients in column 8 also
show that countries with higher per capita GDP and government expenditure accumulate
more capital, while ￿nancial depth (as proxied by privo) is unin￿ uential. The results
are robust to the inclusion of openness to trade, whose coe¢ cient always turns out to be
insigni￿cant and is thus omitted.
In Table 2b, I replicate for capital the exercise reported for TFP in Table 2a. In
column 1, I regress capital on de facto ￿nancial integration and crises from CK-GH.
While banking crises lose signi￿cance, the gross external position has a negative impact
on capital. As mentioned above, the estimates for IFIGDP may deliver a distorted picture
of the link between ￿nancial globalization and economic outcomes, especially if countries
that are de jure closed have large sovereign debt positions (such as most of the African
countries in Table B). To account for this potential distortion, in column 2 I control
also for de jure liberalization IMF and its interaction with the de facto measure. The
coe¢ cients for IFIGDP and IFIGDP*IMF suggest that countries with large gross external
positions su⁄ered a drop in physical capital if de jure closed, while they were not a⁄ected
if de jure open. This result is consistent with the coe¢ cients reported in column 3 for
the interactions of IFIGDP with continental dummies. The only countries that su⁄ered
from external ￿nancial exposition were the African ones, that were mostly de jure closed
as shown in Table B. The interaction with the LDC￿ s in column 4 does not display a
signi￿cant heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization. In columns 5-7, I consider
the alternative set of ￿nancial crises indicators proposed by Bordo et al. (2001). In so
doing, I lose observations for 13 countries, but add two years to the time series. The
20The results do not change if I use IMF_switch5, which equals 1 for the ￿ve years prior to the reform.
16picture does not change signi￿cantly: both de jure and de facto indicators have a negative
coe¢ cient if considered separately (columns 5 and 6), while the e⁄ect of gross external
positions on capital is nil in de jure open and negative in de jure closed countries (as from
column 7). Neither banking nor currency crises have a signi￿cant link with capital stock.
Table 3b reports robustness checks on the di⁄erence in di⁄erences estimates with the
maximum number of controls, reported in column 8 of Table 1b. The ￿rst two columns
refer to the correction proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004). In column 1, I report the
results from regressing the physical capital stock on all control variables but IMF, and
controlling for country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. As in column 8 of Table 1b, the coe¢ cients
for banking crises, real per capita GDP and government expenditure are positive and
signi￿cant, while those for currency crises and ￿nancial depth are nil. I saved the residuals
from the estimation in column 1 only for the countries that experienced a regime shift in
capital account restrictions, and regressed them on IMF. The coe¢ cient and its standard
error in column 2 con￿rm that ￿nancial integration reduces signi￿cantly capital by more
than 8 per cent. In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify the e⁄ect of a policy switch out
of ￿nancial openness. In column 3, I restrict the attention to those countries that were
not closed all the time, and regress capital stock on the usual controls plus an indicator
that takes value one if there is not ￿nancial openness and zero otherwise. In this way,
the coe¢ cient compares the change in capital stock before and after the adoption of
restrictions in the countries that closed their ￿nancial markets with the change in K in
the countries that remained open. The e⁄ect is positive and signi￿cant. In column 4,
I take the full sample and regress K on an indicator that equals 0 if a country is open
in a given year or if it is closed throughout the entire sample, and 1 otherwise. The
positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for IMF_close suggests that capital rose in countries
that closed their ￿nancial markets compared to the countries that were open or remained
closed ever. These results prove that regime switches out of ￿nancial liberalization have
the opposite e⁄ect of switches into it. In columns 5-7, I control in alternative ways for the
pre-reform trends in physical capital. In column 5, I decompose the dummy IMF_switch
in two dummies for switches into and out of liberalization. In column 6, these dummies
are no longer step dummies, but take the form of a three-period linear trend in the three
years prior to reforms. In both cases their introduction does not a⁄ect the signi￿cance
of the coe¢ cient for ￿nancial openness. In column 7 I add a pre-reform trend for each
country that has liberalized. This helps me account for other reforms that countries may
have adopted just before capital account liberalization. Also in this case, no signi￿cant
change occurs with respect to the other regressions.
Overall, countries that removed the restrictions on capital account transactions expe-
17rienced up 14 per cent lower growth in physical capital compared to those that did not.
Countries that doubled their gross external position over GDP (IFIGDP) did 6 to 16 per
cent worse if they kept capital restrictions, while they were not a⁄ected if they removed
them. The occurrence of a banking and currency crisis may hinder capital accumulation,
raise it or even leave it unaltered: the results are not robust across di⁄erent samples.
2.8 Cross-sectional analysis
To study the e⁄ects of ￿nancial openness on TFP and capital in the long run, I estimate
the following growth regressions:
dpi(t￿25;t) = ￿0 + ￿pit￿25 + ￿0
1Xi(t￿25;t) + ￿IFLi(t￿25;t) + uit; (3)
where dpi(t￿25;t) = 100
log(Pit)￿log(Pit￿25)
25 with p = log(P), P 2 fA;Kg, and the regressors
indexed by (t ￿ 25; t) are 25-year period averages. A coe¢ cient estimate ^ ￿ < 0 indicates
that there is conditional convergence. The speed of convergence b can be obtained from
￿ = ￿1001￿eb25
25 . As a proxy of international ￿nancial liberalization (IFL), I start by
considering the IMF de jure indicator (IMF), then replicate the analysis for the de facto
measure (IFIGDP) and Quinn￿ s de jure index (Quinn).
Tables 4a and 5a report the results for TFP growth rate. The coe¢ cients for the
initial level of TFP do not support robustly the hypothesis of conditional convergence in
productivity. The coe¢ cients of banking and currency crises on TFP growth are negative
but only occasionally signi￿cant.
As for the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration, in Table 4a, the IMF de jure proxy for capital
account liberalization has a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient under the basic speci￿ca-
tion in column 1. When I control for crises and their interaction with ￿nancial openness,
in columns 2 and 3, no coe¢ cient turns out signi￿cant. Yet, a positive and signi￿cant
coe¢ cient for ￿nancial liberalization is restored in columns 4-6, where I account for het-
erogeneity. In columns 4 and 5, I interact IMF with dummies for Latin America and
the LDC￿ s. The coe¢ cients for the interaction terms suggest that de jure liberalization
does not spur productivity in developing countries, mainly in Latin America, while it is
bene￿cial in the others. In columns 6, I re-estimate the equation of column 4 leaving
Africa out of the sample, to make sure these ￿nancially closed and poorly performing
countries do not bias upwards the coe¢ cient for the capital account liberalization index.
The results, perfectly replicating column 4, suggest that Africa does not signi￿cantly bias
the estimates. Once the interactive terms are removed from the speci￿cation and other
controls are added, in columns 7 and 8, capital account liberalization loses signi￿cance,
18while ￿nancial depth displays positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients.
In Table 5a, I ￿rst replace the de jure IMF dummy with the de facto measure of
￿nancial integration, IFIGDP. None of the coe¢ cients in column 1 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero. As mentioned in section 2.3, the estimates for IFIGDP may deliver a distorted
picture of the link between ￿nancial globalization and economic outcomes, especially if
countries that are de jure closed have large sovereign debt positions (such as the African
countries in Table B). To account for this potential bias, in column 2 I also control for de
jure liberalization (IMF) and its interaction with the de facto measure. The coe¢ cients
for IMF, IFIGDP and IMF*IFIGDP suggest that only countries that are both de jure
and de facto open bene￿t from ￿nancial integration in terms of TFP growth. Productivity
growth is instead lower in countries holding large gross external positions despite being
de jure closed. This result is consistent with the coe¢ cients reported in columns 3 and 4
for the interactions of IFGDP with continental and LDC￿ s dummies: ￿nancial integration
is bene￿cial in countries outside Africa and Latin America, and mainly in the developed
ones. This evidence lends support to the hypothesis that an increase in gross external
wealth raises TFP growth if it is not due to changes in sovereign foreign debt or loans
from international organizations. Finally, in columns 5-7 I regress productivity growth on
Quinn￿ s de jure index of capital account liberalization and its interactions with continental
and LDC￿ s dummies. As in the previous columns, ￿nancial liberalization is associated with
higher TFP growth mainly in developed countries.
Tables 4b and 5b report the results for capital accumulation. The coe¢ cients for
capital stock at the beginning of the period (K_25) are always negative and signi￿cant,
suggesting that, other things equal, countries starting with a lower endowment experience
a faster growth of physical capital. The estimates for ￿nancial depth are positive and
signi￿cant. All other control variables in Table 4b, including the indicators of banking
and currency crises, are insigni￿cant. The only exception is the coe¢ cient for capital
account liberalization in Latin American, which is negative and signi￿cant. This suggests
that ￿nancial liberalization may have led to capital out￿ ows.
In Table 5b, I replicate the exercise done in Table 5a. Higher gross external positions
spur capital accumulation in de jure open countries, hinder it where residents cannot
access international ￿nancial markets. Consistently with this result, investments grow
with the exposition to foreign capital markets in all countries but the African and Latin
American ones. The e⁄ect of de jure liberalization is insigni￿cant if proxied by Quinn￿ s
index.
In sum, the long-run analysis provides some evidence that ￿nancial integration spurs
productivity growth, mainly in the developed countries, while it has no signi￿cant impact
19on capital accumulation. As emphasized by the empirical growth literature, cross-sectional
estimates have several limits. They do not allow to exploit the time-series variation in the
data on ￿nancial integration, which is particularly important when assessing the e⁄ects of
reforms; nor control for omitted variables, country-speci￿c e⁄ects and endogeneity of the
regressors. Therefore, I move on to the panel analysis.
2.9 Dynamic panel analysis
To exploit the time variation in the proxies of IFL, I could estimate equation (3) on a
panel dataset, assuming uit = ￿i+ ￿t+ "it. This would generate consistency problems,
however. As the right-hand side of equation (3) includes the lagged dependent variable
(pt￿￿), even if "it is not correlated with pt￿￿, the estimates are not consistent, given the
￿nite time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other
explanatory variables. To correct for the bias created by lagged endogenous variables and
the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the approach proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). I estimate the following system with GMM
dpit = ￿0 + ￿dpit￿5 + ￿0
1dXit + ￿dIFLit + d￿t + d"it (4)
pit = ￿0 + ￿pit￿5 + ￿0
1Xi(t￿5;t) + ￿IFLi(t￿5;t) + ￿i + ￿t + "it; (5)
where dpit equals log( Pit
Pit￿5) with P2 {K, A}, and the other regressors are the same as in
the previous equations. Variables indexed by (t￿5; t) are averages over the period between
t-5 and t. ￿i, ￿t and "it are the unobservable country- and time-speci￿c e⁄ects, and the
error term, respectively. The presence of country e⁄ect in equation (5) corrects the omitted
variable bias. The di⁄erences in equation (4) and the instrumental variables estimation
of the system are aimed at amending inconsistency problems. I instrument di⁄erences of
the endogenous and predetermined variables with lagged levels in equation (4) and levels
with di⁄erenced variables in equation (5). For instance, I take pit￿15 as an instrument for
dpit￿5 and IFLit￿10 for dIFLit in (4) and dpit￿10 as an instrument for pit￿5 and dIFLit￿5
for IFLit in (5). I estimate the system by two-step Generalized Method of Moments with
moment conditions E[dpit￿5s ("it ￿ "it￿5)] = 0 for s ￿ 2, and E[dzit￿5s ("it ￿ "it￿5)] = 0
for s ￿ 2 on the predetermined variables z, for equation (4); E[dpi;t￿5s (￿i + "i;t)] = 0 and
E[dzi;t￿5s (￿i + "i;t)] = 0 for s = 1 for equation (5). I treat all regressors as predetermined.
The validity of the instruments is granted under the hypothesis that the residuals from (4)
are not second order serially correlated. Coe¢ cient estimates are consistent and e¢ cient
if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation are satis￿ed. To validate
the estimated model, I apply a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and a test of
20second-order serial correlation of the residuals.21 As pointed out by Arellano and Bond
(1991), the estimates from the ￿rst step are more e¢ cient, while the test statistics from
the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coe¢ cients and statistics from
the ￿rst and second step respectively. Note that in this case the speed of convergence b
obtains from ￿ = e5b.
Tables 6a and 7a report the results for TFP. The coe¢ cients in the ￿rst line of both
tables support robustly the existence of conditional convergence in productivity, with an
implied speed of about 2-3 per cent per year. Under all speci￿cations in Table 6a, de jure
capital account liberalization (IMF) is shown to spur productivity growth, and banking
crises are proven harmful, while currency crises are insigni￿cant. Trade does not seem to
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on TFP growth, nor does ￿nancial depth, as reported in column
3. The interactions IMF*BC and IMF*CC in column 4 suggest that the negative e⁄ects
of ￿nancial crises are not more severe in open countries. Also the interactive terms to
capture heterogeneous e⁄ects of liberalization across continents (column 5) and stages of
development (column 6) are virtually zero. In column 7, I interact the IMF indicator
with a time dummy for the ￿rst half of the sample (taking value 1 through 1975-1989 and
0 elsewhere) in order to capture heterogeneity in the impact of liberalization over time.
Financial integration may be expected to become more e⁄ective as more countries open up
their markets, hence towards the end of the sample. If this were the case, the interaction
in column 7 would be negative. In fact, it is insigni￿cant.
The regressions in Table 6a show the positive impact of ￿nancial liberalization on TFP
to be robust to the adoption of any of the three de jure and de facto measures of integration.
Di⁄erently from the previous cross-sectional analysis, the gross external position stands
alone (in column 1) as a TFP-enhancing factor. As in Table 5a, the positive e⁄ect of
￿nancial globalization is stronger where gross external positions are accompanied by de
jure liberalization, and weaker in countries that rely more heavily on foreign sovereign
debt and loans from international organizations, such as the African ones (columns 3 and
4). The results for Quinn￿ s de jure measure in columns 7-10 tend to con￿rm the previous
evidence. Columns 6 and 10 do not lend much support to the hypothesis of heterogeneous
e⁄ects over time.
The estimates for capital are reported in Tables 6b and 7b. The coe¢ cients for initial
capital stock (K_5) in both tables con￿rm the prediction of the neoclassical growth model,
that capital accumulation slows down as capital grows up towards its steady state value,
21Including too many lags among the instruments can cause the power of the Sargan test to collapse,
potentially hiding the invalidity of instruments (see for example Bowsher, 2002). To avoid this problem, I
restrict the number of lags to t-10 and t-15.
21and also that there is conditional convergence across countries. In Table 6b, the coe¢ cients
for de jure capital account liberalization (IMF) are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
in line with the ones reported in Table 4b. Banking crises depress investment, while the
results for currency crises are not robust. Financial depth, as in Table 4b, is shown to spur
capital accumulation. Table 7b rejects the hypothesis that ￿nancial integration, proxied
by any of the three indicators in use, has an impact on capital accumulation, with the
exception of Latin America, where it may have led to capital out￿ ows.
In Tables 8a and 8b I address heterogeneity in the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration by
re-estimating the equations for TFP and capital on sub-samples. Compared with the
interaction analysis in the previous tables, this approach has the advantage of letting
the coe¢ cients for all regressors vary across continents, stage of development and time.
The disadvantage of this procedure though is that it may signi￿cantly restrict the sam-
ple, thereby reducing the power of the estimates if not making the implementation of
the dynamic panel methodology impossible. This problem arises only to a minor extent
when splitting the sample along the geographical dimension, since the estimations can be
performed on a reasonable number of countries over the entire time-span. Splitting the
sample along the time dimension is more problematic, since the econometric technique re-
quires a minimum of three 5-year observations for each country (four, in order to test for
second order autocorrelation of the residuals). This means that the only viable partition
is 1975-94 vs 1980-99.22
The coe¢ cients in columns 1-4 of Table 8a suggest that de jure capital account lib-
eralization has no impact on productivity in Africa and Latin America, and generally in
the LDC￿ s, while it is bene￿cial in Europe, North America and Asia. De facto integration
instead spurs TFP in all countries, though to a slightly lesser extent in Africa and Latin
America. Interestingly, banking crises are detrimental for TFP only in Africa and Latin
America, and the LDC￿ s in general. Columns 5 and 6 suggest the positive e⁄ect of ￿nan-
cial globalization on productivity to be stronger towards the end of the sample period. In
columns 7 and 8, I estimate the equation on the subsamples of Africa plus Latin America
vis-￿-vis the rest of the world after 1980. The results are very similar to columns 1 and 3,
where observations started in 1975. Table 8b displays no heterogeneity as regards ￿nancial
integration (no e⁄ect on capital accumulation), while it suggests that banking crises may
be less harmful in the developed countries.
Quantitatively, a country that liberalizes and stays open over a ￿ve-year period accord-
ing to the AREAER, outperforms a closed one in terms of TFP by 11 to 15 per cent (by
22Given the already limited size of the sample for which Quinn￿ s indicator is available, I do not perform
sub-sample analysis using this proxy of ￿nancial integration.
2221 per cent if African and Latin American countries are excluded from the sample). Simi-
larly, doubling Quinn￿ s index of capital account liberalization increases TFP by nearly 15
per cent. Moreover, doubling de facto integration (IFIGDP) implies raising productivity
by more than 2 per cent in ￿ve years (more than 5 per cent if the country is also de jure
open).
The results above suggest that international ￿nancial liberalization has a robust pos-
itive direct e⁄ect on TFP, while it hardly a⁄ects capital accumulation. This asymmetric
e⁄ect on the two main components of output growth may help explain why the literature
has struggled to establish a signi￿cant and robust empirical relationship between ￿nancial
integration and GDP growth. To corroborate this claim, I report in Table 9 the results
from estimating the system (4)-(5) for real GDP per worker, using the three measures
of ￿nancial liberalization. On the full sample, de jure capital account liberalization has
statistically zero e⁄ect (columns 1 and 8). Its coe¢ cient becomes positive and signi￿cant
when African and Latin American countries are taken away from the sample (column 2).
The estimates for the de facto measure are positive and signi￿cant on the entire sample
(column 4-5), and more so when excluding Africa and Latin America (column 6). None
of the indicators is signi￿cantly related to GDP per worker and its growth rate in the
developing countries (columns 3 and 7). These results suggest that the response of out-
put per worker to ￿nancial integration follows, though attenuated, the same pattern as
productivity.
3 The indirect channels
In this section I explore more in depth two indirect channels through which ￿nancial
globalization may a⁄ect productivity and investment: banking and currency crises, and
￿nancial development.
3.1 Financial integration and financial crises
The analysis in the last section shows that banking and currency crises may be detrimental
for both capital accumulation and TFP. It is often argued that ￿nancial instability may
be triggered by the exposure to international ￿nancial markets. In this subsection, I
investigate if, and to what extent, the negative e⁄ects of ￿nancial crises should ultimately
be imputed to ￿nancial liberalization. To do so, I estimate on the annual panel dataset
the following probit for the probability of banking and currency crises:
Pr(Crisis_typeit = 1) = ￿(￿o + ￿1Xit + ￿IFLit):
23The variable Crisis_typeit takes value one if a crisis of a given type (systemic, borderline
or any banking crisis, currency crisis) has occurred in country i at time t, zero otherwise.
The vector Xit includes a series of covariates, and IFLit is a proxy of international ￿nancial
liberalization. The reported coe¢ cients represent the percentage changes in the probability
of a crisis associated to an increase in the covariates. The z-statistics reported below each
coe¢ cient are derived from robust standard errors, clustered by country.
Table 10a reports the results for the probability of ￿nancial crises as a function of the
de jure dummy for capital account liberalization (IMF) and a series of covariates. The
coe¢ cient estimates for IMF on the full sample (Panel A) are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero, with the exception of minor (borderline) banking crises, that are 1.7 per cent
more likely in liberalized countries. This evidence is in line with the recent ￿ndings in
Glick et al. (2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006). High in￿ ation is generally responsible for a
higher likelihood of banking crises. High real GDP per capita and growth rate of ￿nancial
depth signi￿cantly reduce the probability of crises. The ￿rst result is in line with the
predictions in Martin and Rey (2006), while the second seems to contradict the ￿bumpy
path￿hypothesis proposed by RanciŁre et al. (2007) and Tornell et al. (2003). Splitting
the sample between developed and developing countries (panels B and C), I ￿nd that IMF
increases the likelihood of (borderline) banking and currency crises in developed countries,
while it has no e⁄ect in the developing ones. Higher per capita income is associated to
a lower likelihood of banking and currency crises, while in￿ ation raises the probability of
banking crises, regardless of the degree of development of a country. Faster growth of
￿nancial depth reduces the likelihood of crises only in the LDC￿ s.
I replicate the estimations of Table 10a using the other indicators of ￿nancial integra-
tion, whose coe¢ cients I report in Table 10b.23 Capital account liberalization, as indexed
by Quinn, raises the probability of minor banking crises in all countries. The coe¢ cients
in the ￿rst row of Table 10b suggest that a country switching from half to totally open
(Quinn=50 to 100) has a 22 per cent higher probability of su⁄ering a minor banking cri-
sis. Its likelihood of experiencing a severe banking or a currency crisis remains unchanged.
The second row of Table 10b tells that the probability of a (systemic) banking crisis rises
by 11 per cent in a developed country experiencing an increase in total foreign assets +
liabilities equal to its GDP (equivalent to a more than 80 per cent rise of IFIGDP in the
average European or North American country). The same change in foreign wealth would
imply a 7 per cent drop in the likelihood that a developing country su⁄ers a currency crisis
23For parsimony, only the coe¢ cents for the proxies of IFL are reported. The estimates for the other
covariates (deposit insurance, real per capita GDP, in￿ ation, trade/gdp and the growth rate of privo) are
available from the author.
24(this would require the average African country to roughly double IFIGDP).
As argued in Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), the onset of a ￿nancial crises may follow
capital account liberalization with some lag. If this were the case, the evidence in Tables
10a and 10b would not be capturing it, since it relies on one-year lags. To account for
delayed e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization, I replicate the probit estimations on the 5-year
averages of the IFL indicators and report the results in Table 10c. IMF only raises the
probability of minor banking crises in developed countries, Quinn does the same, but also
in the developing countries, IFIGDP keeps increasing the likelihood of systemic crises in
developed countries, while reducing the risk of currency crises in the LDC￿ s.
3.2 Financial integration and financial development
Beck et al. (2000) provide evidence that ￿nancial depth increases productivity and, to
a lesser extent, investment. In this section, I assess if these results are robust to the
inclusion of measures of ￿nancial openness, and whether ￿nancial globalization increases
domestic ￿nancial depth.24 Table 11a reports the results of the DPD regressions of TFP
(columns 1-3) and physical capital (columns 4-6) on ￿nancial crises, ￿nancial depth and
alternative indicators of ￿nancial integration. Financial depth a⁄ects positively capital
accumulation throughout most speci￿cations, while its positive impact on productivity is
signi￿cant only when controlling for Quinn￿ s index of capital account liberalization. In any
case, controlling for ￿nancial development does not alter the coe¢ cients for liberalization
in a relevant way, compared to the results in Tables 7a and 7b.
To investigate if ￿nancial globalization raises ￿nancial depth, I regress private credit
over GDP on the IFL indicators and other control variables. The results in Table 11b do
not provide robust support to the existence of a link between ￿nancial liberalization and
￿nancial depth. Together with the previous evidence, this implies that ￿nancial depth
does not seem to be a channel through which ￿nancial globalization a⁄ects the sources of
growth.
4 Discussion
This section relates the results of section 3 with the industry-level evidence in two re-
cent studies on the real e⁄ects of international ￿nancial liberalization and discusses the
theoretical mechanisms that may explain the reaction of TFP.
24In section 3, I control for ￿nancial depth only when using the IMF de jure indicator. Financial depth
seems to foster TFP growth in the cross-sectional estimates, while it has insigni￿cant coe¢ cients once
the time-series dimension is considered and endogeneity is tackled with dynamic panel regressions. I now
extend the analysis to the other measures.
25Section 3 provides evidence that ￿nancial integration is accompanied by an increase
in total factor productivity. A similar conclusion is indirectly drawn by Henry and Sasson
(2008), after performing di⁄erence in di⁄erence analysis on annual industry-level data for
19 developing countries. They argue that de jure equity market liberalization must spur
TFP since it raises real wages much more than investment. Di⁄erently from the present
paper, this work also ￿nds a positive e⁄ect on capital at sectoral level. As a possible
explanation to their results, the authors put forward Delong￿ s (2004) conjecture that
capital ￿ ows to the developing countries raise productivity because they entail imports of
capital goods from the rich countries, embodying technological progress. The results in
section 3 are consistent with this argument only to the extent that the imports of capital
goods do not translate into higher aggregate capital stock. However, the ￿nding that
aggregate productivity grows more in the developed countries than in the LDC￿ s suggests
that the main mechanism may not rely only on the technological content of capital ￿ ows.
A positive link between industry-level investment and capital account liberalization
(both de jure and de facto) is documented also by Levchenko et al. (2008). This study
provides additional evidence that sectoral markups drop and entry-exit dynamics increase
in response to ￿nancial integration, while TFP rises just in the short run. At the aggregate
level, these results may be reconciled with the evidence on TFP reported in section 3.
First, an increase in competition (falling markups, more entry/exit) generally gives rise
to improvements in aggregate productivity. Second, the aggregate increase in TFP may
derive from sectoral reallocations, a compositional e⁄ect which cannot be captured with the
speci￿cations the authors estimate. Acharya et al. (2007) report evidence that domestic
￿nancial liberalization in the US (bank branching deregulation) induced a reallocation of
capital towards the sectors with more e¢ cient risk-return pro￿le. It may be the case that
also international ￿nancial liberalization brings similar improvements in the e¢ ciency of
capital allocation across sectors, thereby increasing aggregate productivity.
The evidence in this paper raises three questions. First, how to explain the zero e⁄ect
of ￿nancial intagration on aggregate capital in section 3? A possible answer may be that
estimates only capture an average e⁄ect across countries and over time. This implies that,
if capital increases in certain countries receiving in￿ ows and drops in others experiencing
out￿ ows, the net e⁄ect may well be zero.
Second, even assuming that capital ￿ ows cancel out so that the net e⁄ect is nil, why
does the increase in productivity not foster investment? The results in Table 5a suggest
that ￿nancial integration raises TFP towards the end of the sample period. If capital
follows TFP with some lag, it is possible that the reaction is not captured in the data
yet. An alternative explanation may rely on a risk-diversi￿cation argument. As shown in
26Townsend and Ueda (2008) with respect to domestic ￿nancial liberalization in Thailand,
better risk allocation may cause a drop in precautionary savings, which reduces capital
supply. On aggregate data, this may o⁄set the demand side e⁄ects given by an increase
in TFP.
Third, what mechanism can explain the positive e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on
productivity, independently of capital accumulation? A plausible way to rationalize this
result is to draw a parallel between ￿nancial integration and trade openness. In particular,
one can interpret ￿nancial openness as integration in the market for ￿nancial services. In
a world with market imperfections, ￿nancial services (such as screening, monitoring, debt
structuring, etc.) can be seen as an important factor of production for ￿rms that need
to raise external capital. Since the quality and varieties of ￿nancial services are likely to
di⁄er across countries and sectors, ￿nancial liberalization may generate the typical gains
from trade. Specialization allows ￿rms in all countries to buy any given ￿nancial service
at the best price. Moreover, the access to new varieties of services may provide ￿rms with
the most appropriate ￿nancial instruments. The rise in TFP would be due to an increase
in allocative e¢ ciency, as empirically documented by Galindo et al. (2007). If there is
specialization in ￿nancial services, one should observe ￿nancial intermediaries enter foreign
markets following comparative advantage patterns, as recent evidence from microdata
shows. For instance, the results in Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) suggest that foreign banks
enter more often in countries where banks are less e¢ cient, and Clarke et al. (1999)
show that they tend to serve the sectors in which they have more expertise. Moreover,
following the entry of foreign actors, the ￿nancial intermediation sector experiences an
overall increase in e¢ ciency, as documented by Claessens et al. (2001) and Giannetti and
Ongena (2008).
An alternative explanation for the rise in TFP is o⁄ered by the models that inter-
pret ￿nancial integration as a means of international risk diversi￿cation (see Obstfeld,
1994). The improvement in risk sharing provided by portfolio diversi￿cation promotes
risk taking at the country level, so that riskier and more productive projects get ￿nanced,
thereby raising aggegate TFP. Capital reallocation across countries and ￿rms has instead
ambiguous e⁄ects on aggregate investment.
To conclude this section, I propose a preliminary assessment of the empirical plausibil-
ity of the improved-e¢ ciency hypothesis versus the risk-diversi￿cation argument focusing
on their implications for economic volatility. According to the ￿rst hypothesis, ￿nancial
integration may reduce the volatility of aggregate output, since it induces an e¢ ciency
improvement in ￿nancial services, that translates into a possibly safer allocation of funds
(as domestic liberalization does in Acharya el al., 2007). In the alternative view instead,
27￿nancial integration tends to promote risk taking at the country level, which eventually
raises output volatility. I thus regress the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of
real GDP and TFP on the indicators of ￿nancial integration and ￿nancial crises. Table
12 reports negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients for the IFL indicators, which do not lend
much support to the hypothesis that ￿nancial integration raises TFP by promoting domes-
tic risk taking. This is in line with the evidence in Kose et al. (2007) that output growth
volatility tends to drop with ￿nancial integration, while international risk sharing is not
much a⁄ected. Although this preliminary evidence does not aim at providing conclusive
support to the mechanism based on the e¢ ciency gains from trade in ￿nancial services
it opens an interesting avenue for future research. In particular, investigating the impact
of international ￿nancial liberalization on capital reallocation across industries seems a
necessary step to further understand the theoretical mechanism behind the results in this
paper and in the recent industry-level studies.
5 Conclusions
A wide literature has focused on the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on GDP growth,
often ￿nding mixed results. To better understand the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization,
however, it is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper is
an attempt to probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of
￿nancial openness on the two main sources of income growth: capital accumulation and
productivity. Contrary to the existing literature, I ￿nd fairly robust results, using both de
facto and de jure indicators of ￿nancial integration. In particular, ￿nancial liberalization
has a positive direct e⁄ect on productivity, mainly in the developed countries, while it has
virtually none on capital accumulation.
In my analysis I take into account two possible indirect channels through which ￿nan-
cial globalization may a⁄ect economic performance: ￿nancial development and ￿nancial
crises. The most interesting result applies to the latter. As expected, banking and (to
a minor extent) currency crises have a strong negative impact on economic performance,
though the likelihood that they occur does not rise much under ￿nancial integration. In
fact, globalization raises only the probability of minor banking crises in developed coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the positive direct e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalization on TFP survives.
Finally, the paper brie￿ y discusses a possible explanation for the positive direct e⁄ect
of ￿nancial integration on productivity. The idea is that removing restrictions to inter-
national ￿nancial transaction opens the door to trade in ￿nancial services, which can be
considered as a production factor. As in trade models, openness generates gains from
specialization and increasing varieties, which raise e¢ ciency in the allocation of capital,
28thereby fostering TFP growth. This mechanism is supported by some existing evidence
on the pattern of internationalization of ￿nancial intermediaries, and on the allocative
e¢ ciency of investments. Also the negative correlation between aggregate volatility and
￿nancial integration lends some support to this hypothesis.
As a next step to better understand the mechanism linking ￿nancial integration to
aggregate productivity, more work has to be done on ￿rm or industry-level data. In par-
ticular, future research should investigate the pattern of resource reallocation across ￿rms
and sectors and relate it to ￿nancial integration. Another interesting result in this paper
suggests that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial globalization may vary depending on the instruments
that are interantionally traded. To investigate this idea, it would be interesting to sep-
arately address the e⁄ects of equity, private debt and sovereign debt. This may bridge
the literature on ￿nancial liberalization and growth to the most recent studies on the
composition of countries￿portfolios, and give new interesting insights.
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33Country Open Close Country Open Close
Argentina 1967-1993 1970 Madagascar 1967 1968
Austria 1991 Malaysia 1973
Bangladesh Mali




Cameroon 1967 1968 Nepal
Canada Netherlands
Chile New Zealand 1984
Colombia Nicaragua 1978
Costa Rica 1980-1995 1974-1982 Nigeria
Denmark 1988 Norway 1995
Ecuador 1971-1988-1995 1970-1986-1993 Panama
Egypt Paraguay 1982 1984
El Salvador Peru 1978-1993 1970-1984
Equatorial Guinea Philippines 1969
Ethiopia Portugal 1993
Finland 1991 Sierra Leone




Guatemala 1973-1989 1980 Sweden 1993
Guinea Bissau Switzerland
Hong Kong Thailand




Jamaica United Kingdom 1979




Note. Open and Close report the dates of removal and adoption, respectively, of restrictions on
capital account transactions (source: IMF). All countries enter panel estimations, Mauritius is not
included in the cross-section.
Table A
Sample: Countries, and de jure capital account liberalization (IMF) datesAsia Africa
Latin 
America
Europe & N. 
America
IMF (de jure)  109 0 119 119
IMF (de jure): open (0 to 1) 3 0 12 10
IMF (de jure): close (1 to 0) 1 0 11 0
Quinn (de jure) 56 40 60 73
IFIGDP (de facto) (%) 145 105 150 115
Foreign Assets/GDP (%) 63 20 44 50
Foreign Liabilities/GDP (%) 82 85 105 65
Gross External (FDI+Equity)/GDP (%) 26 15 19 24
Gross External Debt/GDP (%) 99 76 121 81
Banking Crises (borderline) 18 27 24 45
Banking Crises (systemic) 34 76 84 28
Currency Crises 28 56 44 37
TFP growth (%) 1.122 -1.213 -1.515 0.050
K growth (%) 7.306 3.811 3.075 3.043
Observations 286 464 396 354
Countries 13 22 18 17
International Financial Liberalization, crises and economic performance across continents
Note. Lines 2 and 3 report the number of switches into and out of capital account liberalization.
Lines 1 and 10-12 report the number of country-years with IMF=1, BC=1, BC=2, CC=1,
respectively. Quinn's index of financial liberalization is averaged over 48, 52, 72 and 68
observations only. Continent sample averages are reported for the de-facto indicators (IFIGDP and
its components) and the growth rates of TFP and Capital, all expressed as a percentage.
Table BCurrent Account -0.017 0.001 -0.001 -0.019 0.001 -0.001 **
-1.590 0.720 -0.610 -1.560 1.130 -2.140
US real interest -0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.033 *** -0.003 0.001
-1.160 -0.180 0.500 -2.590 -1.590 1.230
Government Size 0.024 0.000 -0.001 0.120 0.004 -0.002
0.310 0.030 -0.200 1.510 0.660 -0.710
Trade -0.043 0.015 *** 0.006 -0.086 0.010 0.004
-0.550 2.650 1.380 -0.910 1.580 0.910
Financial Depth 0.216 *** 0.006 -0.001 0.217 *** -0.004 0.003
3.960 1.480 -0.650 3.210 -1.010 1.000
Institutional Quality 0.039 0.008 * -0.003 *
0.760 1.880 -1.870
Banking Crisis  -0.003 -0.012 * 0.004 -0.031 -0.014 ** 0.002
-0.080 -1.860 1.140 -0.870 -2.100 0.620
Currency Crisis  -0.044 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.002
-1.110 -0.870 -0.310 -0.070 -0.530 0.300
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.058 0.044 0.242 0.105 0.115
Observations 965 962 962 612 611 611
Table C
De jure International Financial Liberalization (IMF) - yearly panel - dprobit
Note. The dependent variable is the probability that capital account restrictions are: absent (IMF=1),
removed (IMF from 0 to 1) or adopted (IMF from 1 to 0). The coefficients in theese columns are
estimated with probit and represent the increase in the probability of capital account liberalization (and its
swicthes) associated with a per cent change in the covariates. Institutional quality is proxied by the
Government Anti-Diversion Policy index. All covariates enter as lagged values. A constant is included in
all regressions. The robust standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a
coefficiant is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Pr[IMF=1] Pr[IMF 
from 0 to 1]
Pr[IMF 
from 1 to 0]
Pr[IMF=1] Pr[IMF 
from 0 to 1]
Pr[IMF 
from 1 to 0]IMF 0.124 *** 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.064 ** 0.062 ** 0.062 *** 0.075 ***









IMF post '85 -0.009
0.022
Banking Crises (BC) -0.041 *** -0.041 *** -0.042 *** -0.041 *** -0.041 *** -0.030 ***
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Currency Crises (CC) -0.020 * -0.020 -0.025 ** -0.020 -0.020 -0.008
0.012 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011








IMF_switch3 -0.350 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.022
0.709 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.014
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1461 1461 1398 1398 1398 1398 1398 913
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 59
IMF -0.039 * -0.093 *** -0.084 *** -0.091 *** -0.151 *** -0.139 *** -0.077 *** -0.091 ***









IMF post '85 -0.013
0.027
Banking Crises (BC) -0.014 * -0.017 ** -0.011 -0.013 * -0.014 * 0.021 ***
0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007
Currency Crises (CC) 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.015
0.015 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
Real p.c. GDP 0.833 ***
0.041




IMF_switch3 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.033 -0.032 -0.036 -0.019
0.023 0.022 0.059 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1497 1497 1432 1432 1432 1432 1432 1117








Note. The dependent variables are the logarithms of TFP in Table 1a, and physical capital in Table 1b. All regressors are in
lagged values. IMF is a de jure dummy indicator of capital account liberalization. The variable IMF_switch3 equals 1 in the 3
years prior to capital account reforms, zero elsewhere. LDC's indicates developing countries. The sample spans between 1975
and 1999. Robust standard errors are reported below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent
confidence level respectively.
Table 1a
Capital account liberalization and TFP- yearly panel - difference in difference
1234IFL = IMF (de jure) -0.047 ** 0.037 *** -0.056 ***
0.021 0.014 0.019
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) -0.015 *** -0.089 *** 0.018 ** 0.023 *** 0.005 -0.095 ***
0.005 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.015








Banking Crises (BC) -0.033 *** -0.027 *** -0.029 *** -0.030 *** -0.046 *** -0.051 *** -0.038 ***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009
Currency Crises (CC) -0.019 -0.016 -0.011 -0.018 -0.026 *** -0.020 * -0.028 ***
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011
Time-continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 1492 1333 1492 1492 1390 1438 1303
Countries 67 67 67 67 54 54 54
IFL = IMF (de jure) -0.139 *** -0.139 *** -0.272 ***
0.028 0.022 0.030
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) -0.019 *** -0.056 *** -0.014 -0.018 * -0.019 ** -0.160 ***
0.006 0.012 0.01 0.010 0.009 0.024








Banking Crises (BC) -0.010 -0.013 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 -0.007
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.014
Currency Crises (CC) 0.011 0.008 0.023 0.011 0.003 0.020 0.002
0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017
Time-continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 1521 1360 1521 1521 1431 1462 1325
Countries 67 67 67 67 54 54 54




International Financial Liberalization and capital stock - yearly panel - difference in difference
13 4 27 56
Note. The dependent variables are the logarithm of TFP in Table 2a, and physical capital in Table 2b. All regressors
are in lagged values. IMF is a de jure dummy indicator of capital account liberalization. IFIGDP is (Total Foreign
Assets+Liabilities)/GDP. The variable IMF_switch3 is included in the regressions of columns 2, 5 and 7. Crises
source CK-GH refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and
Hutchison (2000) respectively. Crises source BEKM-P refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Bordo
et al. (2001). The sample spans between 1975 and 1999, 1973-1999 when BEKM-P is used. Robust standard errors
are reported below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent confidence level
respectively.
Table 2a
International Financial Liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
567 13 4 2
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P CK-GHIMF 0.077 *** 0.069 *** 0.072 *** 0.062 ***
0.013 0.019 0.019 0.020
IMF_close -0.039 ** -0.062 ***
0.02 0.015
Banking Crises (BC) -0.030 *** -0.041 *** -0.030 *** -0.029 *** -0.028 *** -0.028 ***
0.006 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Currency Crises (CC) -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
0.011 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Real p.c. GDP 0.778 *** 0.800 *** 0.777 *** 0.755 *** 0.755 *** 0.746 ***
0.031 0.056 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.036
Financial Depth -0.007 0.019 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
0.011 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
Trade -0.008 0.011 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.000
0.016 0.029 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.018
IPR's 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.012 * 0.012 * 0.012 *









Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pre-IMF trend No No No No No No Yes
Obs 934 291 375 931 814 814 814
Countries 59 17 29 59 57 57 57
IFL= IMF -0.083 *** -0.090 *** -0.093 *** -0.081 ***
0.014 0.026 0.026 0.027
IMF_close 0.036 * 0.082 ***
0.02 0.019
Banking Crises (BC) 0.020 *** 0.041 *** 0.021 *** 0.013 0.013 0.014 *
0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
Currency Crises (CC) 0.017 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.012
0.015 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Real p.c. GDP 0.836 *** 0.719 *** 0.834 *** 0.888 *** 0.888 *** 0.909 ***
0.043 0.057 0.041 0.049 0.049 0.051
Financial Depth -0.010 0.029 -0.007 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026
0.015 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
Government Size 0.051 ** 0.026 0.051 ** 0.023 0.021 0.024









Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pre-IMF trend No No No No No No Yes
Obs 1060 317 465 1117 875 875 814
Countries 61 17 31 61 59 59 57
Full Sample
Note. The dependent variables are the logarithms of TFP in Table 3a, and physical capital in Table 3b. All regressors
are in lagged values. The indicator IMF_close takes value 1 if the country is financially closed as a result of a closing
reform. The variables IMF_switch_in3 and IMF_switch_out3 equal 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account opening
and closing, respectively. The same variables with _trend termination take value 1, 2 and 3 respectively 3, 2 and 1
year prior to reform. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors
are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 3a
Capital account liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference




Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
5




Full Sample Full Sample
67




Capital account liberalization and the capital stock - yearly panel - difference in difference
7 12 56TFP_25 -0.275 -0.354 -0.329 -0.368 -0.401 -1.377 *** -0.907 * -1.031 **
0.357 0.554 0.399 0.378 0.394 0.519 0.479 0.495
IFL = IMF (de jure) 0.680 * 0.554 0.118 1.345 ** 1.130 ** 1.016 * -0.266 -0.177
0.420 0.434 0.834 0.561 0.566 0.592 0.365 0.387
Banking Crisis (BC) -1.492 -1.852 -1.132 -1.448 -1.321 -1.386 -1.292
0.954 1.078 0.959 0.949 1.104 0.943 0.979
Currency Crisis (CC) -2.107 -1.896 -2.241 -2.092 -2.010 -1.938 -1.660
3.765 4.566 3.643 3.703 4.177 3.555 3.794
















R2 0.032 0.109 0.126 0.186 0.133 0.361 0.313 0.334
Obs 65 65 65 65 65 46 58 57
Countries
6
K_25 -0.300 *** -0.293 *** -0.293 ** -0.409 *** -0.279 ** -0.635 *** -0.531 *** -0.432 **
0.115 0.113 0.115 0.136 0.125 0.220 0.185 0.216
IFL = IMF (de jure) 0.736 0.707 0.759 2.020 0.508 1.782 -0.006 -0.119
0.789 0.832 1.196 1.283 0.895 1.298 0.847 0.826
Banking Crisis (BC) -0.692 -0.666 -0.033 -0.730 0.575 0.190 0.199
1.079 1.212 1.116 1.096 1.219 1.274 1.216
Currency Crisis (CC) 1.758 1.846 1.935 1.678 3.268 5.136 3.124
4.841 4.964 4.876 4.746 5.468 5.617 5.028














Government Size 0.132 -0.258
0.576 0.597
R2 0.066 0.071 0.071 0.139 0.073 0.218 0.191 0.229
Obs 69 69 69 69 69 48 63 63
Countries All No Africa All All All All All All
All No Africa All All All All All All




Note. The dependent variables are the 25-year average annual growth rates of TFP (100*dlog(TFP)/25) in Table 4a and of
physical capital (100*dlog(K)/25) in Table 4b. All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the logaritm of the
initial capital stock and TFP level. IMF is the de jure dummy indicator of capital account liberalization averaged over the
sample period. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All (OLS) regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors
are reported below the coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 4a
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and TFP Growth - cross-section
12345 7 8TFP_25 -0.338 -0.167 -0.491 -0.567 -0.988 ** -0.659 -1.137 ** -0.669 ** -0.708 * -0.889 **
0.475 0.379 0.411 0.437 0.500 0.451 0.480 0.333 0.365 0.427
IFL = IMF (de jure) -1.382 ** 0.273 0.156
0.603 0.383 0.749
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) 0.031 -1.565 *** 0.269 *** 0.266 *** 0.252
0.198 0.450 0.096 0.100 0.667
IMF*IFIGDP 1.675 *** -0.075
0.467 0.666
IFL = Quinn (de jure) 1.261 * 1.197 * 0.762 0.879
0.741 0.689 0.745 0.578
IFL*Africa -0.987 ** -0.118
0.455 0.167
IFL*Latin America -0.704 ** -0.402 ***
0.280 0.086
IFL*LDC's -0.748 ** -0.312 ***
0.289 0.098
Banking Crisis -1.550 -1.338 * -1.378 * -1.162 -1.803 * -0.788 -1.291 -2.646 * -2.468 * -3.148 **
0.996 0.712 0.819 0.815 1.034 0.990 0.991 1.420 1.416 1.353
Currency Crisis -1.499 -3.561 -1.839 -2.921 -0.586 -2.293 -1.279 -5.453 *** -4.806 *** -4.558 **
3.799 3.519 3.397 3.101 3.980 3.609 3.677 1.525 1.699 1.745
Crises Source
R2 0.088 0.278 0.291 0.269 0.198 0.357 0.287 0.319 0.281 0.287
Obs 63 63 63 63 56 56 56 52 52 50
K_25 -0.287 ** -0.421 *** -0.585 *** -0.371 ** -0.346 ** -0.679 *** -0.194 -0.376 ** -0.411 ** -0.280
0.127 0.133 0.159 0.145 0.148 0.185 0.195 0.191 0.206 0.191
IFL = IMF (de jure) -1.063 0.636 -0.479
1.333 0.907 1.579
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) 0.048 -1.549 ** 0.283 ** 0.154 -1.045
0.217 0.656 0.117 0.201 1.025
IMF*IFIGDP 1.638 ** 1.079
0.683 1.033
IFL = Quinn (de jure) -0.361 0.042 -0.061 -0.686
0.937 0.919 0.965 0.997
IFL*Africa -1.542 ** -0.537 *
0.771 0.295




Banking Crisis -0.714 -0.418 -0.117 -0.421 -1.703 0.177 -2.448 * -0.555 -1.171 -1.619
1.113 1.083 1.095 1.166 1.178 1.279 1.319 2.488 2.607 2.513
Currency Crisis 1.088 -1.086 -0.169 0.435 2.354 0.355 2.757 -5.501 -5.994 -5.555
4.887 5.000 4.737 5.031 4.965 4.929 4.894 3.529 3.646 3.896
Crises Source
R2 0.062 0.144 0.163 0.077 0.120 0.249 0.155 0.111 0.138 0.097
Obs 66 66 66 66 59 59 59 54 54 52
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and TFP Growth - cross-section
Table 5a
Note. The dependent variables are the 25-year average annual growth rates of TFP (100*dlog(TFP)/25) in Table 5a, and of physical capital
(100*dlog(K)/25) in Table 5b. All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the logaritm of initial TFP and capital stock. IMF is a de jure
dummy indicator of capital account liberalization, Quinn is a de jure indicator of capital account liberalization valued in [0,100], IFIGDP is the gross
external position as a ratio of GDP and measures de facto financial integration. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a
constant. Crises Source CK-GH refers to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), BEKM-P to Bordo et al. (2001). Robust standard errors are reported below the
coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
89 1 0
89 1 0
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and Capital accumulation - cross-section
36 7 12 4 5
Table 5b
12 4 5 36 7TFP_5 0.950 *** 0.877 *** 0.863 *** 0.857 *** 0.886 *** 0.850 *** 0.858 ***
0.118 0.089 0.086 0.101 0.085 0.085 0.093
IFL= IMF (de jure) 0.120 * 0.128 ** 0.109 * 0.245 *** 0.108 * 0.156 *** 0.144 **
0.073 0.065 0.066 0.096 0.057 0.053 0.063
Banking Cisis -0.149 ** -0.111 ** -0.119 -0.141 * -0.139 * -0.160 **
0.076 0.046 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.075
Currency Crisis 0.238 0.082 0.501 -0.001 -0.139 0.293















Sargan (p-val) 0.686 0.286 0.576 0.733 0.551 0.374 0.524
m2 (p-val) 0.649 0.752 0.811 0.84 0.947 0.664 0.785
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 331 331 268 331 331 331 331
Countries 68 68 59 68 68 68 68
K_5 0.948 *** 0.962 *** 0.935 *** 0.977 *** 0.946 *** 0.969 *** 0.977 ***
0.032 0.020 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.021
IFL= IMF (de jure) 0.064 0.009 -0.032 0.056 0.094 -0.018 -0.020
0.065 0.059 0.076 0.073 0.070 0.074 0.055
Banking Crisis -0.142 *** -0.066 ** -0.115 *** -0.121 *** -0.129 *** -0.147 ***
0.049 0.032 0.037 0.048 ..047 0.052
Currency Crisis -0.166 -0.124 -0.114 -0.159 -0.028 -0.161

















Sargan (p-val) 0.198 0.387 0.823 0.519 0.204 0.262 0.774
m2 (p-val) 0.859 0.610 0.598 0.405 0.47 0.586 0.679
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 344 344 278 344 344 344 344
Countries 70 70 61 70 70 70 70
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period level of TFP (Table 6a)
and capital stock (Table 6b). All regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The indicator
IMF (dummy on yearly basis) refers to de jure capital account liberalization. Trade is import+export, Financial Depth
is total credit to the private sector, Government Size is government expenditure; all are expressed as a ratio of GDP.
The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the
two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and ***
indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan
overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
Table 6b
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and Capital accumulation - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
1 234567
Table 6a
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and TFP - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
7 6 1 2345TFP_5 0.909 *** 0.909 *** 0.915 *** 0.872 *** 0.876 *** 0.891 ** 0.969 *** 0.819 ** 0.947 *** 0.928 *** 0.609 *** 0.679 *** 0.659 *** 1.000 ***
0.105 0.066 0.087 0.085 0.094 0.106 0.103 0.126 0.108 0.096 0.114 0.108 0.114 0.062
IFL= IFIGDP (de facto)  0.024 *** -0.033 0.021 *** 0.019 *** 0.027 *** 0.009 0.142 ** 0.127
0.007 0.025 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.061 0.091
IFL= IMF (de jure)  0.037 0.024 ** -0.019
0.065 0.009 0.070
IMF*IFIGDP 0.053 ** 0.027
0.026 0.065
IFL= Quinn (de jure) 0.147 ** 0.001 0.062 0.172 ** -0.024
0.074 0.096 0.086 0.071 0.073
IFL*Africa -0.087 ** -0.098 ** -0.112
0.044 0.044 0.100




IFL*Pre_1985 0.018 * -0.121
0.010 0.094
Banking Crisis -0.135 -0.107 * -0.089 -0.106 * -0.148 * -0.122 -0.034 -0.017 0.024 -0.060 -0.098 -0.155 ** -0.127 * -0.124 *
0.084 0.057 0.068 0.063 0.083 0.081 0.088 0.091 0.073 0.075 0.064 0.067 0.070 0.064
Currency Crisis 0.433 0.141 0.149 0.046 0.228 0.409 0.348 0.146 0.325 0.340 -0.291 -0.266 * -0.366 ** -0.354 **
0.364 0.287 0.321 29.000 0.315 0.341 0.417 0.283 0.394 0.389 0.215 0.149 0.187 0.172
Sargan (p-val) 0.224 0.571 0.150 0.148 0.249 0.609 0.473 0.854 0.909 0.864 0.846 0.941 0.999 0.998
m2 (p-val) 0.952 0.836 0.864 0.843 0.834 0.831 0.493 0.532 0.586 0.544 0.890 0.418 0.839 0.038
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 321 317 321 321 321 321 209 209 209 209 313 328 308 261
Countries 65 65 65 65 65 65 59 59 59 59 53 53 53 51
K_5 0.972 *** 0.965 *** 0.953 *** 0.947 *** 0.971 *** 0.975 *** 0.966 *** 0.968 *** 0.994 *** 0.966 *** 0.971 *** 0.969 *** 0.979 *** 0.994 ***
0.021 0.019 0.023 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.013
IFL= IFIGDP (de facto)  0.000 -0.056 -0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.017 -0.068
0.008 0.043 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.038 0.059




IFL= Quinn (de jure) -0.008 0.063 0.038 0.068 -0.066
0.061 0.055 0.058 0.059 0.044
IFL*Africa -0.063 -0.076 0.065 *
0.061 0.062 0.036
IFL*Latin America -0.033 ** -0.018
0.015 0.025
IFL*LDC's -0.008 0.034 ***
0.011 0.010
IFL*Pre_1985 0.013 -0.153 ***
0.012 0.049
Banking Crisis -0.130 *** -0.081 ** -0.115 *** -0.099 *** -0.124 *** -0.126 *** -0.073 -0.055 -0.088 ** -0.056 -0.105 *** -0.096 *** -0.062 * 0.011
0.042 0.034 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.043
Currency Crisis -0.239 -0.357 * -0.286 -0.318 -0.206 -0.231 0.235 0.030 0.142 0.265 -0.372 ** -0.343 *** -0.319 ** -0.077
0.269 0.199 0.305 0.251 0.219 0.263 0.196 0.169 0.171 0.189 0.151 0.119 0.125 0.102
Sargan (p-val) 0.265 0.204 0.279 0.202 0.285 0.401 0.199 0.339 0.333 0.597 0.748 0.907 0.999 0.968
m2 (p-val) 0.837 0.674 0.920 0.652 0.731 0.760 0.940 0.536 0.846 0.920 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.850
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crises Source
Obs 332 328 332 332 332 332 216 216 216 216 321 336 336 268
Countries 67 67 67 67 67 67 60 60 60 60 54 54 54 52
CK-GH CK-GH BEKM-P
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and TFP - DPD - System GMM
Table 7b
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and Capital accumulation - DPD - System GMM
CK-GH CK-GH BEKM-P
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
11 12 13 14
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P
Table 7a
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period level of TFP in Table 7a and of the capital stock in Table 7b. All regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year
period averages. The indicators IMF (dummy on yearly basis) and Quinn (between 0 and 100) refer to de jure capital account liberalization. IFIGDP is the gross external position as a ratio of GDP and proxies de
facto financial integration. Crises Source CK-GH refers to the banking and currency crises indicators of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchison (2000) respectively. Crises Source BEKM-P refers
to the banking and currency crises indicators of Bordo et al. (2001). The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM
procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan
overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
BEKM-P BEKM-P BEKM-P




CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH CK-GH
91 0 24 5 16 3
CK-GH
2 1 91 0 78 45IFL= IMF (de jure)  -0.280 0.119 * 0.210 ** 0.076 0.081 0.144 ** -0.018 0.238 **
0.098 0.060 0.102 0.119 0.083 0.071 0.101 0.097
Banking Crisis -0.189 * -0.114 * -0.014 -0.201 * -0.068 -0.145 ** -0.172 * 0.000
0.109 0.063 0.076 0.107 0.066 0.065 0.101 0.069
Currency Crisis 0.058 0.163 -0.511 * 0.303 -0.111 0.122 -0.063 -0.399
0.319 0.348 0.308 0.435 0.627 0.370 0.359 0.282
Sargan (p-val) 0.705 0.166 0.760 0.445 0.789 0.157 0.528 0.866
m2 (p-val) 0.957 0.715 0.211 0.980 0.760 0.894 0.983 0.293
Obs 190 231 141 240 264 268 155 113
Countries 39 47 29 49 67 68 39 29
IFL= IFIGDP (de facto) 0.022 *** 0.024 *** 0.023 ** 0.027 *** 0.010 0.023 *** 0.019 ** 0.026 **
0.007 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.011
Banking Crisis -0.206 * -0.111 0.019 -0.204 ** 0.013 -0.122 -0.179 * 0.018
0.121 0.072 0.063 0.089 0.080 0.077 0.106 0.061
Currency Crisis 0.304 0.425 -0.275 0.407 -0.369 0.386 0.230 -0.244
0.324 0.431 0.331 0.529 0.521 0.403 0.339 0.361
Sargan (p-val) 0.399 0.418 0.832 0.526 0.928 0.110 0.262 0.670
m2 (p-val) 0.970 0.731 0.409 0.913 0.897 0.769 0.647 0.720
Obs 177 234 144 227 257 259 144 115
Countries 36 47 29 46 65 65 36 29
IFL= IMF (de jure)  0.036 0.088 -0.003 0.046 0.102 -0.05 -0.032 0.039
0.066 0.164 0.079 0.095 0.101 0.055 0.075 0.069
Banking Crisis -0.121 ** -0.143 -0.078 -0.146 *** -0.153 *** -0.144 *** -0.116 * -0.066
0.061 0.153 0.061 0.056 0.058 0.049 0.060 0.052
Currency Crisis -0.209 -0.361 0.587 ** -0.202 -0.408 0.016 -0.009 0.566 **
0.262 0.408 0.290 0.223 0.302 0.259 0.320 0.272
Sargan (p-val) 0.627 0.900 0.858 0.519 0.263 0.267 0.617 0.637
m2 (p-val) 0.684 0.961 0.878 0.567 0.100 0.459 0.333 0.924
Obs 207 117 137 247 273 279 160 118
Countries 42 24 28 50 69 70 40 30
IFL= IFIGDP (de facto) -0.001 0.070 -0.003 -0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.000
0.010 0.135 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
Banking Crisis -0.098 * -0.034 -0.097 -0.128 ** -0.170 *** -0.156 *** -0.122 ** -0.089 *
0.051 0.068 0.064 0.053 0.058 0.056 0.062 0.054
Currency Crisis -0.306 -0.954 ** 0.694 -0.410 * -0.114 0.096 -0.021 0.711 **
0.213 0.459 0.452 0.239 0.335 0.320 0.297 0.361
Sargan (p-val) 0.313 0.984 0.919 0.338 0.210 0.210 0.470 0.447
m2 (p-val) 0.855 0.831 0.905 0.765 0.060 0.504 0.338 0.966
Obs 192 102 140 232 265 267 147 120
Countries 39 21 28 47 67 67 37 30
1980-1999 1980-1999 
Africa & L. A.
1980-1999 No 
(Africa & L. A.)
Note. The dependent variables are 5-year log-difference and log of the end-of-period level of TFP (Table 8a) and capital stock (Table 8b). All
regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The indicators IMF (dummy on yearly basis) and Quinn (between 0 and 100)
refer to de jure capital account liberalization. IFIGDP is the gross external position as a ratio of GDP and proxies de facto financial integration. The
sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure.
Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent,
respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
Africa & Latin 
America




International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and Capital - DPD - System GMM - Sub-samples
1 3 456 7 8 2
1980-1999 1980-1999 
Africa & L. A.
1980-1999 No 
(Africa & L. A.)
Africa & Latin 
America
No (Africa & 
Latin America)
LDC's 1975-1994 No Africa
Table 8a
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and TFP - DPD - System GMM - Sub-samples
1 3 456 7 8 2IFL = IMF (de jure) 0.068 0.096 *** 0.040 -0.009
0.045 0.032 0.059 0.051
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) 0.015 ** -0.036 * 0.018 *** 0.008
0.007 0.022 0.003 0.007
IMF*IFIGDP 0.053 **
0.024
IFL = Quinn (de jure) 0.064
0.050
Banking Crisis -0.066 ** 0.006 -0.091 *** -0.051 -0.047 0.047 -0.092 ** -0.036
0.032 0.030 0.036 0.042 0.032 0.035 0.046 0.036
Currency Crisis -0.185 -0.186 -0.029 -0.020 -0.041 -0.274 * 0.155 0.049 **
0.288 0.120 0.206 0.234 0.161 0.169 0.207 0.122
Sargan (p-val) 0.459 0.975 0.589 0.303 0.468 0.898 0.230 0.426
m2 (p-val) 0.942 0.06 0.881 0.900 0.644 0.110 0.886 0.838
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 333 141 242 323 319 144 229 209
Countries 68 29 49 65 65 29 46 59
Table 9
2
No (Africa and 
Latin America)
6
No (Africa and 
Latin America)
13
LDC's All Countries All Countries




Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the log of the end-of-period real GDP per worker. All regressors are log-
differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The indicators IMF (dummy on yearly basis) and Quinn (between 0 and 100) refer to de jure
capital account liberalization. IFIGDP is the gross external position as a ratio of GDP and proxies de facto financial integration. The sample spans
between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients
and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The
p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
78 45
All CountriesIMF 0.060 0.017 ** -0.031 -0.017
1.120 2.080 -0.630 -0.800
Deposit Insurance 0.096 * -0.003 0.099 0.000
1.650 -0.510 1.500 -0.020
Real p.c. GDP -0.084 *** 0.001 -0.085 *** -0.019 *
-2.790 0.250 -2.560 -1.730
inflation 0.011 *** -0.038 ** 0.010 *** -0.002
2.530 -2.200 2.790 -0.640
Trade 0.039 0.009 * 0.003 0.031 **
1.100 1.770 0.080 2.200
Financial Depth (growth) -0.325 *** -0.015 -0.275 *** -0.153 **
-3.390 -1.070 -3.610 -2.300
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.072 0.087 0.024
Obs 1077 1077 1077 1039
IMF 0.399 *** 0.003 *** 0.029 0.061 **
4.850 2.890 0.250 2.270
Deposit Insurance 0.078 0.003 ** -0.113 -0.027
0.660 2.290 -0.620 -1.510
Real p.c. GDP -0.129 ** 0.000 -0.131 *** -0.029 ***
-2.200 0.720 -2.550 -3.060
inflation 0.166 *** -0.001 0.164 *** -0.029
3.400 -0.500 3.100 -0.690
Trade 0.209 *** 0.002 *** 0.006 0.045 **
2.670 3.070 0.090 2.400
Financial Depth (growth) 0.209 0.002 * 0.085 0.015
0.600 1.830 0.290 0.190
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.381 0.263 0.054
Obs 283 283 283 258
IMF -0.015 0.006 -0.035 -0.036
-0.260 0.340 -0.630 -1.590
Deposit Insurance 0.131 * -0.034 ** 0.218 *** 0.010
1.900 -2.460 3.120 0.460
Real p.c. GDP -0.100 *** 0.002 -0.099 *** -0.018
-2.570 0.270 -2.560 -1.330
inflation 0.005 ** -0.048 0.006 ** 0.000
2.030 -1.580 2.300 0.020
Trade 0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.021
0.030 0.950 -0.110 1.250
Financial Depth (growth) -0.573 *** -0.035 -0.476 *** -0.258 ***
-4.400 -1.330 -4.130 -3.550
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.064 0.094 0.036
Obs 794 794 794 781
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises, that
equals 1 if a crisis of a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC, systemic BC or
currency crisis) occurs, 0 otherwise. All regressors are in lagged values. The estimation
is performed on yearly observations with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and z-statistics are reported below the
coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per
cent respectively. 
Capital account liberalization and financial crises
Table 10a
Panel A: Full Sample
12 3 4
Any BC Borderline BC Systemic BC Currency
Currency
Panel C: Developing Countries
Panel B: Developed Countries
Any BC Borderline BC Systemic BC
Currency Any BC Borderline BC Systemic BCQuinn 0.164 ** 0.365 0.108 -0.012 0.068 -0.029
2.050 1.310 1.100 -0.270 0.860 -0.420
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.149 0.035 0.009 0.062 0.009
Obs 455 164 291 381 129 252
IFIGDP 0.008 0.117 *** -0.009 -0.040 ** -0.012 -0.067 ***
0.380 2.770 -0.560 -2.040 -0.720 -3.700
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.120 0.048 0.036 0.043 0.052
Obs 1165 315 850 1074 270 804
Quinn -0.013 0.095 -0.001 0.222 *** 0.304 *** 0.079 ***
-0.220 1.110 -0.020 4.720 2.640 3.960
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.666 0.056 0.107 0.223 0.183
Obs 455 164 291 455 164 291
IFIGDP 0.010 0.107 *** -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.600 3.070 -0.540 -0.840 -0.330 -0.650
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.292 0.070 0.048 0.228 0.054
Obs 1165 315 850 1165 315 850
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises, that equal 1 if a crisis of
a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC, systemic BC or currency crisis) occurs, 0 otherwise. All
covariates of Table 10a, except IMF, are included but not reported. All regressors are in lagged values.
The estimation is performed on yearly observations with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients. *, **








Any Banking Crisis Currency Crises
International Financial Liberalization and financial crises - yearly panel - dprobit
Table 10b
Panel A
Full Sample Developed Developing Full Sample
Systemic Banking Crises Borderline Banking Crises
12IMF_5year 0.057 0.312 *** 0.004 -0.029 0.031 -0.045
1.200 3.860 0.060 -1.200 1.160 -1.550
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.130 0.059 0.021 0.042 0.029
Obs 1229 315 914 1098 270 828
Quinn_5year 0.077 0.209 0.033 -0.024 0.005 -0.047
1.530 1.210 0.480 -0.910 1.200 -1.330
Pseudo R2 0.350 0.123 0.021 0.021 0.066 0.035
Obs 823 252 571 741 210 531
IFIGDP_5year 0.009 0.095 *** -0.008 -0.032 * -0.006 -0.065 ***
0.450 2.690 -0.530 -1.800 -0.490 -3.350
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.115 0.048 0.032 0.040 0.049
Obs 1165 315 850 1074 270 804
IMF_5year -0.009 -0.023 -0.007 0.182 0.055 ** 0.002
-0.200 -0.200 0.056 1.470 2.140 0.120
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.248 0.072 0.047 0.265 0.055
Obs 1229 315 914 1229 315 914
Quinn_5year -0.042 0.037 -0.074 0.076 *** 0.114 *** 0.076 ***
-0.960 0.550 -1.050 4.350 2.620 3.320
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.358 0.034 0.121 0.278 0.156
Obs 823 252 571 823 252 571
IFIGDP_5year 0.012 0.091 *** -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001
0.710 3.150 -0.540 -0.910 -0.660 -0.550
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.288 0.007 0.048 0.229 0.054
Obs 1165 315 850 1165 315 850
Panel B
Borderline Banking Crises Systemic Banking Crises
56
Full Sample Developed Developing
1




International Financial Liberalization and financial crises - yearly panel - dprobit
Any Banking Crisis Currency Crises
Note. The dependent variables are the indicators of banking and currency crises, that equal 1 if a
crisis of a certain type (any banking crisis, borderline BC, systemic BC or currency crisis) occurs, 0
otherwise. All covariates of Table 10a, except IMF, are included in lagged values but not reported.
The indicators of financial integration are the averages of the past 5 years. The estimation is
performed on yearly observations with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country and z-statistics are reported below the coefficients. *, **
and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
Developed Full Sample
1
Full Sample Developed Developing Developing
34 25 6IFL = IMF (de jure) -0.036 -0.134 *
0.060 0.070
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) 0.011 -0.040 -0.020 ** -0.067
0.009 0.026 0.009 0.043
IMF*IFIGDP 0.059 ** 0.061
0.027 0.046
IFL= Quinn (de jure) -0.041 -0.053
0.929 0.058
Financial Depth 0.045 0.024 0.074 * 0.168 *** 0.153 *** 0.052
0.039 0.035 0.042 0.046 0.041 0.033
Sargan 0.317 0.397 0.993 0.135 0.422 0.540
m2 0.700 0.936 0.720 0.519 0.450 0.788
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 300 296 202 309 305 209
Countries 65 65 58 67 67 59
IFL = IMF (de jure) 0.117 0.401 *
0.181 0.221




IFL= Quinn (de jure) 0.706 ***
0.151
Sargan 0.786 0.555 0.841 0.767
m2 0.650 0.676 0.637 0.242
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-continent No No No No
Obs 289 290 287 193
Countries 65 64 64 56
Note: the dependent variable is private credit over GDP, expressed in log and
log difference. All equations are estimated with two-step system GMM
dynamic panel (DPD) method. Banking and currency crises, the lagged
dependent variable and a constant are included in all specifications. All
regressors are log and log differences of 5-year period averages. The sample
spans between 1975 and 1999. Coefficients and standard errors are reported
from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10,
5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan over-identification
test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the
second step.
Table 11b
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and Financial Depth
1234
Note: the dependent variables are TFP and physical capital expressed in log and log difference. All
equations are estimated with two-step system GMM dynamic panel (DPD) method. Banking and
currency crises, lagged dependent variable and a constant are included in all specifications, the is
included in the DPD. All regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The
sample spans between 1975 and 1999. DPD coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first
step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-
values for the Sargan over-identification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test are






International Financial Liberalization (IFL), Financial Depth, TFP and Capital
Capital Capital TFP
14 5 2
TFPIFL = IMF (de jure) -0.027 * 0.025 -0.052 ** 0.011
0.016 0.026 0.025 0.042
IFL = IFIGDP (de facto) -0.003 0.041 *** 0.004 0.075
0.003 0.011 0.004 0.065
IMF*IFIGDP -0.046 *** -0.071
0.011 0.065
IFL= Quinn (de jure) -0.015 -0.028 ***
0.015 0.010
Banking Crisis 0.069 *** 0.072 *** 0.066 *** 0.084 *** -0.016 -0.006 -0.018 -0.005
0.023 0.025 0.021 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.030 0.013
Currency Crisis -0.017 -0.017 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 0.005 0.002
0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.011
R2 0.197 0.169 0.319 0.493 0.044 0.007 0.167 0.125
Obs 67 67 67 59 70 67 67 60
Note: OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the standard deviations over the period 1975-99 of the annual growth rates of real GDP and
TFP. The regressors are the averages over the period 1975-1999 of the indicators of international financial liberalization and financial crises.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
sd(dlogTFP) sd(dlogTFP) sd(dlogTFP) sd(dlogTFP) sd(dlogGDP) sd(dlogGDP) sd(dlogGDP) sd(dlogGDP)
Table 12
International Financial Liberalization (IFL) and volatility - Cross-section (1975-1999)
123 4 567 8